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引用次数: 0
摘要
本文研究先验、后验和信息集之间的一致性条件对由信息集诱导的定性信念的内省特性的影响。主要结果将一致性条件重新表述为(i) 在没有任何假设的情况下,信息集几乎肯定会形成一个分区;以及 (ii) 在一个状态下的后验等于给定相应信息集的贝叶斯条件概率。这一结果的主要含义是提供了一个可操作的认识论模型,它免除了标准认识论模型中固有的技术假设,如信息集的可计数。其应用包括协议定理、无交易定理和相关均衡的认识论特征。其含义如下。首先,由于定性信念在标准环境中可以还原为完全内省的知识,因此在研究非veridical信念或非内省知识时必须小心谨慎。其次,符合一致性条件的信息分区是由后验唯一决定的。第三,定性信念和概率一信念几乎肯定满足真理公理。本文还揭示了后验的可加性如何产生信念的负内省特性。
On the consistency among prior, posteriors, and information sets
This paper studies implications of the consistency conditions among prior, posteriors, and information sets on introspective properties of qualitative belief induced from information sets. The main result reformulates the consistency conditions as: (i) the information sets, without any assumption, almost surely form a partition; and (ii) the posterior at a state is equal to the Bayes conditional probability given the corresponding information set. The main implication of this result is to provide a tractable epistemic model which dispenses with the technical assumptions inherent in the standard epistemic model such as the countable number of information sets. Applications are agreement theorem, no-trade theorem, and the epistemic characterization of correlated equilibria. Implications are as follows. First, since qualitative belief reduces to fully introspective knowledge in the standard environment, a care must be taken when one studies non-veridical belief or non-introspective knowledge. Second, an information partition compatible with the consistency conditions is uniquely determined by the posteriors. Third, qualitative and probability-one beliefs satisfy truth axiom almost surely. The paper also sheds light on how the additivity of the posteriors yields negative introspective properties of beliefs.
期刊介绍:
The purpose of Economic Theory is to provide an outlet for research - in all areas of economics based on rigorous theoretical reasoning, and
- on specific topics in mathematics which is motivated by the analysis of economic problems. Economic Theory''s scope encompasses - but is not limited to - the following fields. - classical and modern equilibrium theory
- cooperative and non-cooperative game theory
- macroeconomics
- social choice and welfare
- uncertainty and information, intertemporal economics (including dynamical systems)
- public economics
- international and developmental economics
- financial economics, money and banking
- industrial organization Economic Theory also publishes surveys if they clearly picture the basic ideas at work in some areas, the essential technical apparatus which is used and the central questions which remain open. The development of a productive dialectic between stylized facts and abstract formulations requires that economic relevance be at the forefront. Thus, correct, and innovative, mathematical analysis is not enough; it must be motivated by - and contribute to - the understanding of substantive economic problems.
Officially cited as: Econ Theory