{"title":"中国金融数据反垄断推进中的开放银行法律分析","authors":"Mi Wang","doi":"10.1093/jaenfo/jnae003","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\n Open banking develops quickly in China where several large state-owned and private commercial banks have participated in open banking, but the legal foundation is insufficient. The theoretical basis of developing open banking lies in breaking down ‘Data Silos’ to promote the free circulation of data and strengthen competition in the financial data market. Open banking could promote ‘financial data antitrust’, which means reshaping the competitive landscape through promoting the share of monopolized financial data owned by large financial institutions to break their monopoly status in the financial market. It may also bring monopoly risks to financial institutions such as data aggregators and technology platforms. Based on the regulatory and legislative experience of other regions, China should continue the ‘government-guided’ model for developing open banking and pay more attention to protecting financial consumers and increasing their data control rights to better balance privacy protection and financial data sharing. China should set up a rule for ‘financial data right separation’ and formulate antitrust regulations for data aggregators. Based on the special status of Fintech platforms, China should not copy the open banking models of developed countries, but create a ‘two-way sharing’ open banking mechanism to prevent the risk of platform data antitrust.","PeriodicalId":42471,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Antitrust Enforcement","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6000,"publicationDate":"2024-03-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"A legal analysis of open banking in the promotion of financial data antitrust in China\",\"authors\":\"Mi Wang\",\"doi\":\"10.1093/jaenfo/jnae003\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"\\n Open banking develops quickly in China where several large state-owned and private commercial banks have participated in open banking, but the legal foundation is insufficient. The theoretical basis of developing open banking lies in breaking down ‘Data Silos’ to promote the free circulation of data and strengthen competition in the financial data market. Open banking could promote ‘financial data antitrust’, which means reshaping the competitive landscape through promoting the share of monopolized financial data owned by large financial institutions to break their monopoly status in the financial market. It may also bring monopoly risks to financial institutions such as data aggregators and technology platforms. Based on the regulatory and legislative experience of other regions, China should continue the ‘government-guided’ model for developing open banking and pay more attention to protecting financial consumers and increasing their data control rights to better balance privacy protection and financial data sharing. China should set up a rule for ‘financial data right separation’ and formulate antitrust regulations for data aggregators. Based on the special status of Fintech platforms, China should not copy the open banking models of developed countries, but create a ‘two-way sharing’ open banking mechanism to prevent the risk of platform data antitrust.\",\"PeriodicalId\":42471,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Antitrust Enforcement\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.6000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-03-21\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Antitrust Enforcement\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1093/jaenfo/jnae003\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"LAW\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Antitrust Enforcement","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jaenfo/jnae003","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
A legal analysis of open banking in the promotion of financial data antitrust in China
Open banking develops quickly in China where several large state-owned and private commercial banks have participated in open banking, but the legal foundation is insufficient. The theoretical basis of developing open banking lies in breaking down ‘Data Silos’ to promote the free circulation of data and strengthen competition in the financial data market. Open banking could promote ‘financial data antitrust’, which means reshaping the competitive landscape through promoting the share of monopolized financial data owned by large financial institutions to break their monopoly status in the financial market. It may also bring monopoly risks to financial institutions such as data aggregators and technology platforms. Based on the regulatory and legislative experience of other regions, China should continue the ‘government-guided’ model for developing open banking and pay more attention to protecting financial consumers and increasing their data control rights to better balance privacy protection and financial data sharing. China should set up a rule for ‘financial data right separation’ and formulate antitrust regulations for data aggregators. Based on the special status of Fintech platforms, China should not copy the open banking models of developed countries, but create a ‘two-way sharing’ open banking mechanism to prevent the risk of platform data antitrust.
期刊介绍:
The journal covers a wide range of enforcement related topics, including: public and private competition law enforcement, cooperation between competition agencies, the promotion of worldwide competition law enforcement, optimal design of enforcement policies, performance measurement, empirical analysis of enforcement policies, combination of functions in the competition agency mandate, and competition agency governance. Other topics include the role of the judiciary in competition enforcement, leniency, cartel prosecution, effective merger enforcement, competition enforcement and human rights, and the regulation of sectors.