{"title":"伯格均衡、利他主义和社会福利","authors":"Hans Haller","doi":"10.1007/s00355-024-01514-5","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>Welfare and other properties of Berge equilibria are investigated. In particular, we address the questions to what extent Berge equilibrium can select from multiple Nash equilibria; can serve as a substitute for Nash equilibria; can Pareto improve upon Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, some of the recent results on the relation between Berge equilibria and Kantian equilibria are summarized.</p>","PeriodicalId":47663,"journal":{"name":"Social Choice and Welfare","volume":"14 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5000,"publicationDate":"2024-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Berge equilibrium, altruism and social welfare\",\"authors\":\"Hans Haller\",\"doi\":\"10.1007/s00355-024-01514-5\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p>Welfare and other properties of Berge equilibria are investigated. In particular, we address the questions to what extent Berge equilibrium can select from multiple Nash equilibria; can serve as a substitute for Nash equilibria; can Pareto improve upon Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, some of the recent results on the relation between Berge equilibria and Kantian equilibria are summarized.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":47663,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Social Choice and Welfare\",\"volume\":\"14 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.5000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-03-28\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Social Choice and Welfare\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-024-01514-5\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q4\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Social Choice and Welfare","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-024-01514-5","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Welfare and other properties of Berge equilibria are investigated. In particular, we address the questions to what extent Berge equilibrium can select from multiple Nash equilibria; can serve as a substitute for Nash equilibria; can Pareto improve upon Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, some of the recent results on the relation between Berge equilibria and Kantian equilibria are summarized.
期刊介绍：
Social Choice and Welfare explores all aspects, both normative and positive, of welfare economics, collective choice, and strategic interaction. Topics include but are not limited to: preference aggregation, welfare criteria, fairness, justice and equity, rights, inequality and poverty measurement, voting and elections, political games, coalition formation, public goods, mechanism design, networks, matching, optimal taxation, cost-benefit analysis, computational social choice, judgement aggregation, market design, behavioral welfare economics, subjective well-being studies and experimental investigations related to social choice and voting. As such, the journal is inter-disciplinary and cuts across the boundaries of economics, political science, philosophy, and mathematics. Articles on choice and order theory that include results that can be applied to the above topics are also included in the journal. While it emphasizes theory, the journal also publishes empirical work in the subject area reflecting cross-fertilizing between theoretical and empirical research. Readers will find original research articles, surveys, and book reviews.Officially cited as: Soc Choice Welf
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
分享
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：
扫码关注我们
