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引用次数: 0
摘要
本文就西梅斯特在其《刑法基础》(Fundamentals of Criminal Law)一书中关于罪责的理由论述的缺陷提出了四个问题:(1)该论述以道德 "恶习 "为表征;(2)将恶习确定为 "道德 "恶习的依据;(3)行为人对他人利益表现出 "不充分的关心和关注 "涉及什么;以及(4)该论述是关于一般罪责的论述,还是关于刑事罪责的论述,即刑事定罪所需的罪责类型、刑事定罪所需的罪责类型。
This paper raises four queries about Simester’s defective engagement with reason account of culpability found in his Fundamentals of Criminal Law: (1) the characterisation of the account in terms of moral ‘vices’; (2) the basis for identifying a vice as a ‘moral’ vice; (3) what is involved in an agent manifesting ‘insufficient care and concern’ for the interests of others; and (4) whether the account is an account of culpability generally, or is instead an account of criminal culpability, i.e., the type of culpability necessary for criminal conviction.
期刊介绍:
Rationale The philosophy of crime and criminal law has been undergoing a renaissance.Increasing numbers of lawyers and philosophers are researching, writing and teaching in the area. Lawyers who are exploring theoretical issues related to criminal liability and punishment find that they must turn to philosophy. Philosophers recognise the importance of the criminal law as a focus for both analytical and normative inquiry. The practical importance of the subject is also obvious, especially at a time when western governments are having to reconsider their rationales for criminalization and sentencing in the light of substantial changes in criminal justice systems and their social contexts. Until recently, there was no journal solely devoted to the philosophy of crime and criminal law. Criminal Law and Philosophy fills this gap, and provides a platform for the high quality work that is being done in this area.
High quality content; specific and inclusive in scope Criminal Law and Philosophy aims to publish high quality articles that take a philosophical perspective on any issues in the broad field of crime and punishment. The main areas and topics include: crime and criminalization; the content, principles and structure of substantive criminal law; criminal justice and the criminal process; punishment and sentencing. The journal is inclusive in its scope: it publishes articles with a historical focus on earlier philosophical discussions of crime and punishment, as well as articles with a more contemporary focus. It seeks contributions from a range of philosophical schools and approaches, in particular both from analytically oriented philosophers and from those who draw more on contemporary continental philoshophy. Readership Criminal Law and Philosophy is becoming essential reading for academics in philoso phy, in law and in criminology who take a philosophically informed critical, analytical or normative approach to the criminal law and criminal justice. It is also an important resource for students in those subjects, and for practitioners with an interest in philosophical approaches to their practice. Through this journal, readers can access the latest thinking by the best scholars in the philosophy of crime and punishment. Editorial Board The editors, editorial board and advisors constitute an impressive, international group of leading scholars working in the philosophy of crime and punishment. They represent a variety of systems of criminal law, including systems that cross national boundaries.