{"title":"引渡条约与新兴市场公司的东道国地点选择✰","authors":"Tianyou Hu , Shu Yu , Andrew Delios","doi":"10.1016/j.jwb.2024.101542","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Traditional perspectives on interstate cooperation stress its benefits in facilitating foreign direct investment (FDI) by reducing uncertainty in international operations and enhancing mutual trust between countries. Our investigation explores another side of interstate cooperation by discussing the potential risks that can emerge from it. Our fulcrum for exploring risks comes from an explicit consideration of the divergent interests that can exist between nation states and business. We focus on the phenomenon known as bilateral treaties on extradition, which enable one country to request the repatriation of fugitives or convicted criminals from another country through official cooperation. Extradition treaties extend the jurisdictional influence of a firm's home country to a host country. This mechanism can create concerns for firms when they are motivated to use FDI to escape from their home country, especially from certain emerging markets with weak institutions. We propose that emerging market firms can be motivated to circumvent host countries that have established extradition treaties with their home country. Both private-owned and state-owned enterprises can show this behavior, albeit the effect is weaker for state-owned enterprises as compared to private-owned ones. The effect is particularly strong on firms that have documented malfeasance in their home country. We test these ideas on outward FDI made by Chinese firms in 106 foreign countries during 2001–2013.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51357,"journal":{"name":"Journal of World Business","volume":"59 4","pages":"Article 101542"},"PeriodicalIF":8.9000,"publicationDate":"2024-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Extradition treaties and emerging market firms’ host country location choice✰\",\"authors\":\"Tianyou Hu , Shu Yu , Andrew Delios\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.jwb.2024.101542\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>Traditional perspectives on interstate cooperation stress its benefits in facilitating foreign direct investment (FDI) by reducing uncertainty in international operations and enhancing mutual trust between countries. Our investigation explores another side of interstate cooperation by discussing the potential risks that can emerge from it. Our fulcrum for exploring risks comes from an explicit consideration of the divergent interests that can exist between nation states and business. We focus on the phenomenon known as bilateral treaties on extradition, which enable one country to request the repatriation of fugitives or convicted criminals from another country through official cooperation. Extradition treaties extend the jurisdictional influence of a firm's home country to a host country. This mechanism can create concerns for firms when they are motivated to use FDI to escape from their home country, especially from certain emerging markets with weak institutions. We propose that emerging market firms can be motivated to circumvent host countries that have established extradition treaties with their home country. Both private-owned and state-owned enterprises can show this behavior, albeit the effect is weaker for state-owned enterprises as compared to private-owned ones. The effect is particularly strong on firms that have documented malfeasance in their home country. We test these ideas on outward FDI made by Chinese firms in 106 foreign countries during 2001–2013.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":51357,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of World Business\",\"volume\":\"59 4\",\"pages\":\"Article 101542\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":8.9000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-04-10\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of World Business\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"91\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1090951624000221\",\"RegionNum\":1,\"RegionCategory\":\"管理学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of World Business","FirstCategoryId":"91","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1090951624000221","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"BUSINESS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Extradition treaties and emerging market firms’ host country location choice✰
Traditional perspectives on interstate cooperation stress its benefits in facilitating foreign direct investment (FDI) by reducing uncertainty in international operations and enhancing mutual trust between countries. Our investigation explores another side of interstate cooperation by discussing the potential risks that can emerge from it. Our fulcrum for exploring risks comes from an explicit consideration of the divergent interests that can exist between nation states and business. We focus on the phenomenon known as bilateral treaties on extradition, which enable one country to request the repatriation of fugitives or convicted criminals from another country through official cooperation. Extradition treaties extend the jurisdictional influence of a firm's home country to a host country. This mechanism can create concerns for firms when they are motivated to use FDI to escape from their home country, especially from certain emerging markets with weak institutions. We propose that emerging market firms can be motivated to circumvent host countries that have established extradition treaties with their home country. Both private-owned and state-owned enterprises can show this behavior, albeit the effect is weaker for state-owned enterprises as compared to private-owned ones. The effect is particularly strong on firms that have documented malfeasance in their home country. We test these ideas on outward FDI made by Chinese firms in 106 foreign countries during 2001–2013.
期刊介绍:
The Journal of World Business holds a distinguished position as a leading publication within the realm of International Business. Rooted in a legacy dating back to 1965, when it was established as the Columbia Journal of World Business, JWB is committed to disseminating cutting-edge research that reflects significant advancements in the field. The journal actively seeks submissions that propel new theoretical frameworks and innovative perspectives on International Business phenomena. Aligned with its domain statement, submissions are expected to possess a clear multinational, cross-border, or international comparative focus, while remaining pertinent to the study of management and organizations. JWB particularly encourages submissions that challenge established theories or assumptions, presenting pioneering or counterintuitive findings. With an inclusive approach, the journal welcomes contributions from diverse conceptual and theoretical traditions, encompassing allied social sciences and behavioral sciences. Submissions should either develop new theories or rigorously test existing ones, employing a variety of qualitative, quantitative, or other methodological approaches. While JWB primarily caters to scholars and researchers, it values contributions that explore implications for Multinational Enterprises and their management, as well as ramifications for public policy and the broader societal role of business.