休谟终究是规律论者完成一场反革命

IF 0.3 4区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Hume Studies Pub Date : 2024-04-09 DOI:10.1353/hms.2024.a924232
Peter Millican
{"title":"休谟终究是规律论者完成一场反革命","authors":"Peter Millican","doi":"10.1353/hms.2024.a924232","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Abstract:</p><p>Traditionally, Hume has widely been viewed as the standard-bearer for <i>regularity</i> accounts of causation. But between 1983 and 1990, two rival interpretations appeared—namely the <i>skeptical realism</i> of Wright, Craig, and Strawson, and the <i>quasi-realist projectivism</i> of Blackburn—and since then the interpretative debate has been dominated by the contest between these three approaches, with projectivism recently appearing the likely winner. This paper argues that the controversy largely arose from a fundamental mistake, namely, the assumption that Hume is committed to the subjectivity of our conception of causal necessity. That assumption generated tensions within the regularity account, which the skeptical realist and quasi-realist alternatives, in very different ways, purported to resolve. But a broader and more balanced view of the textual evidence, taking due account of the relatively neglected sections where Hume <i>applies</i> the results of his analysis, tells strongly in favour of an objectivist regularity view, both in respect of causation and causal necessity. Despite some complications, the upshot is a far more straightforward reading of Hume than those that have hitherto dominated this long-running debate.</p></p>","PeriodicalId":29761,"journal":{"name":"Hume Studies","volume":"48 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3000,"publicationDate":"2024-04-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Hume as Regularity Theorist—After All! Completing a Counter-Revolution\",\"authors\":\"Peter Millican\",\"doi\":\"10.1353/hms.2024.a924232\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p><p>Abstract:</p><p>Traditionally, Hume has widely been viewed as the standard-bearer for <i>regularity</i> accounts of causation. But between 1983 and 1990, two rival interpretations appeared—namely the <i>skeptical realism</i> of Wright, Craig, and Strawson, and the <i>quasi-realist projectivism</i> of Blackburn—and since then the interpretative debate has been dominated by the contest between these three approaches, with projectivism recently appearing the likely winner. This paper argues that the controversy largely arose from a fundamental mistake, namely, the assumption that Hume is committed to the subjectivity of our conception of causal necessity. That assumption generated tensions within the regularity account, which the skeptical realist and quasi-realist alternatives, in very different ways, purported to resolve. But a broader and more balanced view of the textual evidence, taking due account of the relatively neglected sections where Hume <i>applies</i> the results of his analysis, tells strongly in favour of an objectivist regularity view, both in respect of causation and causal necessity. Despite some complications, the upshot is a far more straightforward reading of Hume than those that have hitherto dominated this long-running debate.</p></p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":29761,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Hume Studies\",\"volume\":\"48 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.3000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-04-09\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Hume Studies\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1353/hms.2024.a924232\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"PHILOSOPHY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Hume Studies","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hms.2024.a924232","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

摘要:传统上,人们普遍认为休谟是因果关系规律性论述的标准制定者。但在1983年至1990年间,出现了两种对立的解释--即赖特、克雷格和斯特劳森的怀疑现实主义和布莱克本的准现实主义投射主义。本文认为,这场争论在很大程度上源于一个根本性的错误,即假设休谟致力于我们因果必然性概念的主观性。这一假设在规律性论证中产生了紧张关系,而怀疑现实主义和准现实主义以截然不同的方式试图解决这些紧张关系。但是,对文本证据进行更广泛、更平衡的审视,并适当考虑到休谟应用其分析结果的相对被忽视的部分,就会发现在因果关系和因果必然性两方面,客观主义的规律性观点都大获全胜。尽管存在一些复杂因素,但与迄今为止主导这场旷日持久辩论的那些观点相比,休谟的解读要直截了当得多。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
Hume as Regularity Theorist—After All! Completing a Counter-Revolution

Abstract:

Traditionally, Hume has widely been viewed as the standard-bearer for regularity accounts of causation. But between 1983 and 1990, two rival interpretations appeared—namely the skeptical realism of Wright, Craig, and Strawson, and the quasi-realist projectivism of Blackburn—and since then the interpretative debate has been dominated by the contest between these three approaches, with projectivism recently appearing the likely winner. This paper argues that the controversy largely arose from a fundamental mistake, namely, the assumption that Hume is committed to the subjectivity of our conception of causal necessity. That assumption generated tensions within the regularity account, which the skeptical realist and quasi-realist alternatives, in very different ways, purported to resolve. But a broader and more balanced view of the textual evidence, taking due account of the relatively neglected sections where Hume applies the results of his analysis, tells strongly in favour of an objectivist regularity view, both in respect of causation and causal necessity. Despite some complications, the upshot is a far more straightforward reading of Hume than those that have hitherto dominated this long-running debate.

求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
0.20
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
期刊最新文献
The Testimony of Sense: Empiricism and the Essay from Hume to Hazlitt by Tim Milnes (review) Hume as Regularity Theorist—After All! Completing a Counter-Revolution Hume on Self-Government and Strength of Mind Hume beyond Theism and Atheism Hume's Theory of Moral Judgment in Light of His Explanatory Project
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1