{"title":"(为排除性理由辩护","authors":"Ezequiel Monti","doi":"10.1080/20403313.2023.2297580","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In a recent paper, Daniel Whiting has argued that there are no exclusionary reasons (i.e., second-order reasons not to act for a reason). The premise of the argument is what he calls the motivation...","PeriodicalId":501391,"journal":{"name":"Jurisprudence","volume":"2014 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-04-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"(Really) defending exclusionary reasons\",\"authors\":\"Ezequiel Monti\",\"doi\":\"10.1080/20403313.2023.2297580\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"In a recent paper, Daniel Whiting has argued that there are no exclusionary reasons (i.e., second-order reasons not to act for a reason). The premise of the argument is what he calls the motivation...\",\"PeriodicalId\":501391,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Jurisprudence\",\"volume\":\"2014 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-04-12\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Jurisprudence\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1080/20403313.2023.2297580\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Jurisprudence","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/20403313.2023.2297580","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
In a recent paper, Daniel Whiting has argued that there are no exclusionary reasons (i.e., second-order reasons not to act for a reason). The premise of the argument is what he calls the motivation...