M. Todd Henderson, Irena Hutton, Danling Jiang, Matthew Pierson
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引用次数: 0
摘要
我们研究了具有法律专业知识的首席执行官何时对公司有价值。一般来说，律师 CEO 与就业民权、合同、劳动、人身伤害和证券诉讼的频率和严重程度呈负相关。这种影响的部分原因是首席执行官对诉讼风险的管理和其他风险政策的减少。律师型首席执行官还与提供额外法律监督的守门人增加以及具有高诉讼风险的创新活动减少有关。在合规要求和监管压力增强的时期，以及在诉讼风险较高或增长机会较好的行业，律师 CEO 更有价值。
We study when CEOs with legal expertise are valuable for firms. In general, lawyer CEOs are negatively associated with frequency and severity in employment civil rights, contract, labor, personal injury, and securities litigation. This effect is partly induced by the CEO’s management of litigation risk and reduction in other risky policies. Lawyer CEOs are further associated with an increase in gatekeepers providing additional legal oversight and a decrease in innovative activities with high litigation risk. Lawyer CEOs are more valuable during periods of enhanced compliance requirements and regulatory pressure and in industries with high litigation risk or better growth opportunities.
期刊介绍：
The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis (JFQA) publishes theoretical and empirical research in financial economics. Topics include corporate finance, investments, capital and security markets, and quantitative methods of particular relevance to financial researchers. With a circulation of 3000 libraries, firms, and individuals in 70 nations, the JFQA serves an international community of sophisticated finance scholars—academics and practitioners alike. The JFQA prints less than 10% of the more than 600 unsolicited manuscripts submitted annually. An intensive blind review process and exacting editorial standards contribute to the JFQA’s reputation as a top finance journal.
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