{"title":"迭代可接受性并不完善广泛形式合理性","authors":"Emiliano Catonini","doi":"10.1093/ej/ueae032","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"I show that, in an extensive-form game, the outcomes that are consistent with Iterated Admissibility (i.e., with the iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies) need not be consistent with Extensive-form Rationalizability.","PeriodicalId":501319,"journal":{"name":"The Economic Journal","volume":"14 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-04-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Iterated Admissibility does not refine Extensive-Form Rationalizability\",\"authors\":\"Emiliano Catonini\",\"doi\":\"10.1093/ej/ueae032\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"I show that, in an extensive-form game, the outcomes that are consistent with Iterated Admissibility (i.e., with the iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies) need not be consistent with Extensive-form Rationalizability.\",\"PeriodicalId\":501319,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"The Economic Journal\",\"volume\":\"14 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-04-18\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"The Economic Journal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/ueae032\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"The Economic Journal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/ueae032","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Iterated Admissibility does not refine Extensive-Form Rationalizability
I show that, in an extensive-form game, the outcomes that are consistent with Iterated Admissibility (i.e., with the iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies) need not be consistent with Extensive-form Rationalizability.
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