{"title":"报应论与客观态度","authors":"Sofia Jeppsson","doi":"10.33392/diam.1906","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"It has been argued that a retributivist criminal justice system treats offenders with a respect lacking in alternative criminal justice systems; retributivism presumably recognizes that offenders are fellow members of the moral community who can be held responsible for their actions. One version of the respect argument builds on P.F. Strawson’s moral responsibility theory. According to Strawson, we may take either a participant or objective attitude toward other people. The former is the default attitude when interacting with other adults, whereas the latter is fit for children and the mentally disabled or ill, whom we merely try to manage and handle as best we can. The participant attitude also involves holding people responsible when they do wrong. Supposedly, a retributivist criminal justice system functions as a natural continuation of our everyday, participant, and responsibility-holding practices, unlike alternative systems that adopt an objective attitude toward offenders. I argue that this is wrong. The participant attitude requires reciprocity and, usually, some level of equality too. Even an idealized retributivist system has little room for this, not to mention the flawed versions of this system we see in reality.","PeriodicalId":507415,"journal":{"name":"Diametros","volume":" 29","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-04-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Retributivism and The Objective Attitude\",\"authors\":\"Sofia Jeppsson\",\"doi\":\"10.33392/diam.1906\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"It has been argued that a retributivist criminal justice system treats offenders with a respect lacking in alternative criminal justice systems; retributivism presumably recognizes that offenders are fellow members of the moral community who can be held responsible for their actions. One version of the respect argument builds on P.F. Strawson’s moral responsibility theory. According to Strawson, we may take either a participant or objective attitude toward other people. The former is the default attitude when interacting with other adults, whereas the latter is fit for children and the mentally disabled or ill, whom we merely try to manage and handle as best we can. The participant attitude also involves holding people responsible when they do wrong. Supposedly, a retributivist criminal justice system functions as a natural continuation of our everyday, participant, and responsibility-holding practices, unlike alternative systems that adopt an objective attitude toward offenders. I argue that this is wrong. The participant attitude requires reciprocity and, usually, some level of equality too. Even an idealized retributivist system has little room for this, not to mention the flawed versions of this system we see in reality.\",\"PeriodicalId\":507415,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Diametros\",\"volume\":\" 29\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-04-19\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Diametros\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.33392/diam.1906\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Diametros","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.33392/diam.1906","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
摘要
有人认为,报应主义刑事司法制度对待罪犯的尊重是其他刑事司法制度所缺乏的;报应主义大概承认罪犯是道德社会的成员,他们可以为自己的行为负责。尊重论的一个版本建立在 P.F. 斯特劳森的道德责任理论之上。斯特劳森认为,我们可以对他人采取参与或客观的态度。前者是与其他成年人互动时的默认态度,而后者则适用于儿童、智障者或病人,我们只是尽力管理和处理他们。参与者的态度还包括在人们做错事时追究他们的责任。据说,报应主义刑事司法制度是我们日常、参与和追究责任做法的自然延续,与对罪犯采取客观态度的其他制度不同。我认为这是错误的。参与者的态度要求互惠,通常还要求某种程度的平等。即使是理想化的报应主义制度也很少有这样的空间,更不用说我们在现实中看到的这种制度的缺陷版本了。
It has been argued that a retributivist criminal justice system treats offenders with a respect lacking in alternative criminal justice systems; retributivism presumably recognizes that offenders are fellow members of the moral community who can be held responsible for their actions. One version of the respect argument builds on P.F. Strawson’s moral responsibility theory. According to Strawson, we may take either a participant or objective attitude toward other people. The former is the default attitude when interacting with other adults, whereas the latter is fit for children and the mentally disabled or ill, whom we merely try to manage and handle as best we can. The participant attitude also involves holding people responsible when they do wrong. Supposedly, a retributivist criminal justice system functions as a natural continuation of our everyday, participant, and responsibility-holding practices, unlike alternative systems that adopt an objective attitude toward offenders. I argue that this is wrong. The participant attitude requires reciprocity and, usually, some level of equality too. Even an idealized retributivist system has little room for this, not to mention the flawed versions of this system we see in reality.