设计战利品箱:对利润和福利的影响

IF 4 2区 管理学 Q2 BUSINESS Marketing Science Pub Date : 2024-05-07 DOI:10.1287/mksc.2023.0007
Jin Miao, Sanjay Jain
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引用次数: 0

摘要

战利品箱是一种虚拟产品的概率分配,消费者只有在购买后才知道其确切结果。消费者有时会多次购买这些商品,直到获得自己喜欢的产品。由于战利品箱近年来大受欢迎,它们经常被批评为剥削和社会浪费。在本研究中,我们建立了一个风格化模型来研究战利品箱的最优设计及其对利润和社会福利的影响。我们发现,企业可能会给事先对称的产品分配不对称的概率。企业可以利用战利品箱以低价向用户提供产品,而这些用户在传统定价策略下是不会购买这些产品的。由于更好的价格歧视和市场扩张,战利品箱能使企业获得更高的利润。与普遍批评 "战利品箱 "有害社会的观点相反,我们的分析表明,"战利品箱 "策略可以提高社会福利。一些平台承诺,消费者只需购买一定数量的商品,就能获得心仪的产品。与传统观点相反,我们的分析表明,这种策略可以增加公司利润,同时降低消费者福利:Anthony Dukes 担任资深编辑:在线附录见 https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.2023.0007。
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Designing Loot Boxes: Implications for Profits and Welfare

A loot box is a probabilistic allocation of virtual products, the exact outcome of which is known to consumers only after purchase. Consumers sometimes purchase these goods multiple times until their preferred products are obtained. As loot boxes have been gaining enormous popularity in recent years, they are often criticized as exploitative and socially wasteful. In this study, we develop a stylized model to study the optimal design of loot boxes and its impact on profits and social welfare. We find that firms may assign asymmetric probabilities to ex ante symmetric products. Firms could use loot boxes to offer products at low prices to users who would not buy these products under the traditional pricing strategy. Loot boxes enable firms to earn higher profits because of better price discrimination and market expansion. Contrary to the widespread criticism of loot boxes as socially harmful, our analysis reveals that the loot box strategy can improve social welfare. Some platforms promise that consumers can obtain their preferred products with no more than a certain number of purchases. Contrary to conventional wisdom, our analysis reveals that such a strategy can increase firm’s profits while reducing consumer welfare.

History: Anthony Dukes served as the senior editor.

Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.2023.0007.

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来源期刊
Marketing Science
Marketing Science BUSINESS-
CiteScore
8.60
自引率
10.00%
发文量
94
期刊介绍: Marketing Science is a publication of the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) publication (SSCI indexed). We invite authors to submit for peer review their best marketing-oriented research. We accept many types of manuscripts. Please consider us as an author-friendly outlet for your research. We are THE premier journal focusing on empirical and theoretical quantitative research in marketing. Marketing Science promises to provide constructive, fair, and timely reviews with the goal of identifying the best submissions for publication. Topics covered in Marketing Science include the following: -Advertising- Buyer Behavior- Channels- Competitive Strategy- Forecasting- Marketing Research- New Product Development- Pricing and Promotions- Sales Force Management- Segmentation- Services Marketing- Targetability.
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