从价税和从量税与企业社会责任的比较

IF 1.1 4区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2024-05-08 DOI:10.1111/jpet.12690
Po-Yuan Hsiao, K. L. Glen Ueng, Cheng-Hau Peng, Horn-In Kuo
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文研究了在双头垄断中,间接税制度与企业社会责任(CSR)的福利等级。研究结果表明,两家公司的成本和企业社会责任不对称都起着重要作用。如果成本效率高的企业具有更高的企业社会责任水平,传统税收理论的标准结果就会持续。也就是说,从价税(特定补贴)政策被认为优于特定税(从价补贴)政策。然而,如果成本效率低的企业的企业社会责任水平显著较高,标准结果就会发生逆转。在寡头垄断模式或税收约束条件下,这一结果依然稳健。
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Comparing ad valorem and specific taxes with corporate social responsibility

This paper examines the welfare ranking of indirect tax systems with corporate social responsibility (CSR) in a duopoly. Findings show that the two firms' cost and CSR asymmetries both play important roles. If the cost-efficient firm has a higher CSR level, the standard result in traditional tax theory is sustainable. Namely, ad valorem tax (specific subsidy) policies are considered superior to specific tax (ad valorem subsidy) policies. However, if the cost-inefficient firm has a significantly higher CSR level, the standard result is reversed. This result remains robust in an oligopoly model or under a tax revenue constraint.

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来源期刊
自引率
36.40%
发文量
68
期刊介绍: As the official journal of the Association of Public Economic Theory, Journal of Public Economic Theory (JPET) is dedicated to stimulating research in the rapidly growing field of public economics. Submissions are judged on the basis of their creativity and rigor, and the Journal imposes neither upper nor lower boundary on the complexity of the techniques employed. This journal focuses on such topics as public goods, local public goods, club economies, externalities, taxation, growth, public choice, social and public decision making, voting, market failure, regulation, project evaluation, equity, and political systems.
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