Etienne Billette de Villemeur, Sebastián Cea-Echenique, Conrado Cuevas
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引用次数: 0
摘要
我们修改了一个结果,即在价格不确定的情况下,在公共物品提供博弈中,捐款与福利之间存在正相关关系(Gradstein et al. Soc Choice Welf 10(4):371-382, 1993)。作者在命题 3 中指出,当价格不确定性导致私人捐款减少时,福利就会减少。相比之下,我们的研究表明,在某些条件下,捐款的减少与消费者福利的改善是相关联的。这一结果非常重要,因为有关提供公共产品的公共政策往往以公民参与等指标为基础,而正如本说明所示,这些指标可能构成误导信号。
Private provision of public goods under price uncertainty: a comment
We revise a result positing that there is a positive relationship between contributions and welfare in a public good provision game under price uncertainty (Gradstein et al. Soc Choice Welf 10(4):371–382, 1993). The authors state in Proposition 3 that welfare decreases when price uncertainty induces a reduction in private contributions. By contrast, we show that, under certain conditions, a reduction in contributions can be associated with an improvement in consumer welfare. This result is important because public policy regarding the provision of public goods is often based on indicators such as citizen participation, which, as this note shows, may constitute a misleading signal.
期刊介绍:
Social Choice and Welfare explores all aspects, both normative and positive, of welfare economics, collective choice, and strategic interaction. Topics include but are not limited to: preference aggregation, welfare criteria, fairness, justice and equity, rights, inequality and poverty measurement, voting and elections, political games, coalition formation, public goods, mechanism design, networks, matching, optimal taxation, cost-benefit analysis, computational social choice, judgement aggregation, market design, behavioral welfare economics, subjective well-being studies and experimental investigations related to social choice and voting. As such, the journal is inter-disciplinary and cuts across the boundaries of economics, political science, philosophy, and mathematics. Articles on choice and order theory that include results that can be applied to the above topics are also included in the journal. While it emphasizes theory, the journal also publishes empirical work in the subject area reflecting cross-fertilizing between theoretical and empirical research. Readers will find original research articles, surveys, and book reviews.Officially cited as: Soc Choice Welf