{"title":"Covid-19 疫苗采购中不断变化的非政治因素","authors":"Henning Deters","doi":"10.17645/pag.8230","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Populist governments engage in “unpolitics” when the electoral incentives for doing so outweigh the distributive risks from policy failure. Studying the joint procurement of vaccines against Covid-19, I show that a group consisting of mostly populist governments led by Austria negotiated in bad faith, rejected compromise solutions, and obstructed joint problem-solving. They deployed these “unpolitical” tactics only once the legal framework for joint procurement was in place and the roll-out of the jointly ordered vaccines had begun. At this point, populist governments no longer faced the distributive risk of having limited access to affordable vaccines. By contrast, the electoral incentives for hard-nosed bargaining in bad faith increased, as the distributive issue of vaccine allocation became more salient and as populist governments came under pressure to deflect responsibility for having ordered insufficient vaccine doses.","PeriodicalId":51598,"journal":{"name":"Politics and Governance","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5000,"publicationDate":"2024-05-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Changing Unpolitics of Covid‐19 Vaccine Procurement\",\"authors\":\"Henning Deters\",\"doi\":\"10.17645/pag.8230\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Populist governments engage in “unpolitics” when the electoral incentives for doing so outweigh the distributive risks from policy failure. Studying the joint procurement of vaccines against Covid-19, I show that a group consisting of mostly populist governments led by Austria negotiated in bad faith, rejected compromise solutions, and obstructed joint problem-solving. They deployed these “unpolitical” tactics only once the legal framework for joint procurement was in place and the roll-out of the jointly ordered vaccines had begun. At this point, populist governments no longer faced the distributive risk of having limited access to affordable vaccines. By contrast, the electoral incentives for hard-nosed bargaining in bad faith increased, as the distributive issue of vaccine allocation became more salient and as populist governments came under pressure to deflect responsibility for having ordered insufficient vaccine doses.\",\"PeriodicalId\":51598,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Politics and Governance\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":2.5000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-05-13\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Politics and Governance\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"90\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.8230\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"社会学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"POLITICAL SCIENCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Politics and Governance","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.8230","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"POLITICAL SCIENCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
The Changing Unpolitics of Covid‐19 Vaccine Procurement
Populist governments engage in “unpolitics” when the electoral incentives for doing so outweigh the distributive risks from policy failure. Studying the joint procurement of vaccines against Covid-19, I show that a group consisting of mostly populist governments led by Austria negotiated in bad faith, rejected compromise solutions, and obstructed joint problem-solving. They deployed these “unpolitical” tactics only once the legal framework for joint procurement was in place and the roll-out of the jointly ordered vaccines had begun. At this point, populist governments no longer faced the distributive risk of having limited access to affordable vaccines. By contrast, the electoral incentives for hard-nosed bargaining in bad faith increased, as the distributive issue of vaccine allocation became more salient and as populist governments came under pressure to deflect responsibility for having ordered insufficient vaccine doses.
期刊介绍:
Politics and Governance is an innovative offering to the world of online publishing in the Political Sciences. An internationally peer-reviewed open access journal, Politics and Governance publishes significant, cutting-edge and multidisciplinary research drawn from all areas of Political Science. Its central aim is thereby to enhance the broad scholarly understanding of the range of contemporary political and governing processes, and impact upon of states, political entities, international organizations, communities, societies and individuals, at international, regional, national and local levels. Submissions that focus upon the political or governance-based dynamics of any of these levels or units of analysis in way that interestingly and effectively brings together conceptual analysis and empirical findings are welcome. Politics and Governance is committed to publishing rigorous and high-quality research. To that end, it undertakes a meticulous editorial process, providing both the academic and policy-making community with the most advanced research on contemporary politics and governance. The journal is an entirely open-access online resource, and its in-house publication process enables it to swiftly disseminate its research findings worldwide, and on a regular basis.