The Challenge of Defining the Secular

Judges have long wrestled with the gigantean task of defining religion, with some describing the task as being ‘called upon to ponder the imponderable’, an impossible task, and even misguided. Despite these sentiments, and comments in almost every legal definition expressing the impossibility of the task, judges have, in fact, been able to come up with numerous legal definitions for religion. These have been applied in myriad circumstances to define the outer limits of the rights and responsibilities of states, religious communities, organisations, and individuals. By contrast, the term secular has rarely been judicially defined. However, it is no-less important in defining the rights and responsibilities of states and their citizens and residents, particularly in light of the number of states that claim, implicitly or explicitly, to be secular. This paper, therefore, (re)examines the definition of the secular as it pertains to the concept of the secular state. It considers the need for a legal definition of the secular with particular reference to constitutional and other legal instruments that include the term. It then examines the difference between the terms secular, secularisation and secularism, noting the often erroneous conflation as well as the inevitable interaction and overlap between these key concepts. Finally, drawing on existing classifications of legal definitions of religion, the paper classifies definitions of the secular into three overarching classifications, namely ‘historical’, ‘substantive’ and ‘characteristic’.