{"title":"集体美德理论","authors":"Matthew Baddorf, Noah McKay","doi":"10.26556/jesp.v27i3.2005","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We introduce Imitationism, a new theory of collective virtue—that is, of virtues and vices held by collectives such as corporations and governments. This theory has the advantage of clearly explaining how collectives can have virtues in robustly nonreductive ways without appealing to group minds. We then use this theory to elucidate some examples of collective virtue and respond to some objections.","PeriodicalId":508700,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy","volume":"2 5","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-05-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"A Theory of Collective Virtue\",\"authors\":\"Matthew Baddorf, Noah McKay\",\"doi\":\"10.26556/jesp.v27i3.2005\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We introduce Imitationism, a new theory of collective virtue—that is, of virtues and vices held by collectives such as corporations and governments. This theory has the advantage of clearly explaining how collectives can have virtues in robustly nonreductive ways without appealing to group minds. We then use this theory to elucidate some examples of collective virtue and respond to some objections.\",\"PeriodicalId\":508700,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy\",\"volume\":\"2 5\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-05-23\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v27i3.2005\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v27i3.2005","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
We introduce Imitationism, a new theory of collective virtue—that is, of virtues and vices held by collectives such as corporations and governments. This theory has the advantage of clearly explaining how collectives can have virtues in robustly nonreductive ways without appealing to group minds. We then use this theory to elucidate some examples of collective virtue and respond to some objections.