从推论主义角度理解他人

IF 0.6 3区 哲学 Q4 SOCIOLOGY THEORIA Pub Date : 2024-06-01 DOI:10.1111/theo.12534
Haruka Iikawa
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引用次数: 0

摘要

他者 "是现代哲学的奥秘之一。既然 "他者 "被认为在本质上不同于 "自我",那么如何理解 "他者 "就是一个难题。首先,理解他者意味着什么?我从规范推论的角度来探讨这个问题,阐述了理解他人的信念和行为意味着什么。我提出,我们应该区分归因理解和基本理解。归因式理解旨在明确他人的思维方式,而基本理解则是对他人思维方式的认可。通过对比这两种理解,我们可以理性地了解人们是如何理解对方的。
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Understanding the other from an inferentialist perspective
‘The other’ is one of the mysteries of modern philosophy. Since the other is thought to be essentially different from the self, how we can understand each other is a difficult problem. In the first place, what does it mean to understand the other? I address this question from the perspective of normative inferentialism, by explicating what it means to understand the other's beliefs and actions. I propose that we should distinguish between attributional and fundamental understanding. While attributional understanding serves to specify the other's ways of thinking, fundamental understanding is an endorsement of them. Contrasting these two types of understanding gives us a rational picture of how people understand each other.
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来源期刊
THEORIA
THEORIA SOCIOLOGY-
CiteScore
0.60
自引率
0.00%
发文量
18
审稿时长
24 weeks
期刊介绍: Since its foundation in 1935, Theoria publishes research in all areas of philosophy. Theoria is committed to precision and clarity in philosophical discussions, and encourages cooperation between philosophy and other disciplines. The journal is not affiliated with any particular school or faction. Instead, it promotes dialogues between different philosophical viewpoints. Theoria is peer-reviewed. It publishes articles, reviews, and shorter notes and discussions. Short discussion notes on recent articles in Theoria are welcome.
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