统一内核安全调查:定量分析得出的见解和趋势

Alex WollmanDakota State University, John HastingsDakota State University
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引用次数: 0

摘要

由 LibOS 演化而来的 Unikernels 正在成为一种虚拟化技术,可与云提供商目前使用的虚拟化技术相媲美。Unikernels 将用户空间和内核空间合并为一个 "统一 "的内存空间,并省略了应用程序运行所不需要的功能,从而大大减少了所需资源。然而,被删除的功能影响深远,其中包括已成为常见安全技术的组件,如地址空间布局随机化(ASLR)、数据执行预防(DEP)和不可执行位(NX 位)。这就对单核的实际安全性提出了质疑。本研究提出了一种使用 TF-IDF 分析单内核研究文献中安全讨论焦点的定量方法。基于2013-2023年间33篇单核相关论文的语料库,我们的分析发现,内存保护扩展和数据执行预防是出现频率最低的话题,而SGX则是出现频率最高的话题。研究结果量化了单内核安全研究中的优先事项和假设,揭示了未充分开发的攻击面所带来的潜在风险。这种量化方法广泛适用于揭示利基安全领域的趋势和差距。
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A Survey of Unikernel Security: Insights and Trends from a Quantitative Analysis
Unikernels, an evolution of LibOSs, are emerging as a virtualization technology to rival those currently used by cloud providers. Unikernels combine the user and kernel space into one "uni"fied memory space and omit functionality that is not necessary for its application to run, thus drastically reducing the required resources. The removed functionality however is far-reaching and includes components that have become common security technologies such as Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR), Data Execution Prevention (DEP), and Non-executable bits (NX bits). This raises questions about the real-world security of unikernels. This research presents a quantitative methodology using TF-IDF to analyze the focus of security discussions within unikernel research literature. Based on a corpus of 33 unikernel-related papers spanning 2013-2023, our analysis found that Memory Protection Extensions and Data Execution Prevention were the least frequently occurring topics, while SGX was the most frequent topic. The findings quantify priorities and assumptions in unikernel security research, bringing to light potential risks from underexplored attack surfaces. The quantitative approach is broadly applicable for revealing trends and gaps in niche security domains.
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