关于 "老挝的宏观经济失衡、外债和金融体系 "的评论

IF 4.5 3区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS Asian Economic Policy Review Pub Date : 2024-06-03 DOI:10.1111/aepr.12478
Toshiro Nishizawa
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Overall, the surviving Lao economy faces macroeconomic imbalances, overshadowed by a public and publicly guaranteed debt of 112% of gross domestic product (GDP) at the end of 2022.</p><p>The Lao economy grew by 7–8% annually over a decade before slowing down to 3–6% in 2018 onward as the government recognized the urgent need for fiscal consolidation. The higher growth until 2017 was driven by ambitious infrastructure investment, synchronized with widening external current account deficits financed by massive foreign direct investment and parallel public sector borrowing. Heightened fiscal and external sector vulnerabilities accompanied this accelerated growth.</p><p>Despite the government's efforts to promote the manufacturing sector, the economy's reliance on the resources-based sector persists. According to the Lao Statistics Bureau, between 2015 and 2022 the agricultural share of GDP gradually declined from 18% to 15%, and the mining and quarrying share from 12% to 7%, but the electricity share increased from 8% to 14%. In the same period, the nontradable sector remains dominant, with services remaining above 40% and construction increasing from 7% to 12%. In contrast, the manufacturing sector remained around 9–10%.</p><p>Manufacturing faces such structural constraints as labor shortages and competitive imports from Thailand and China. One to three minimum wage differentials between Laos and Thailand encourage Lao workers to pursue jobs in Thailand, the largest cross-border destination for Lao workers with 226,000 documented Lao migrant workers as of mid-2023, according to the International Labour Organization. Industrial diversification is a challenge, except for tourism potential for now.</p><p>Considering the resources-based sector's dominance in the Lao economy, Mieno and Demachi (<span>2024</span>) should re-examine their claim that the fear of the resource curse is not imminent.</p><p>Chronic current account deficits due to large debt servicing and unbanked foreign exchange earnings kept foreign exchange reserves around US$0.6–1.0 billion in the 2010s. However, the Export–Import Bank of China's debt service deferrals since 2020 and the swap arrangement with the People's Bank of China helped increase the reserves to US$1.8 billion as of September 2023.</p><p>Recent research shows that a debt trap narrative vis-à-vis China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is an unfounded myth (Nishizawa, <span>2023</span>). A debtor trapped with unsustainable debt gets its creditor trapped with unpaid debt.</p><p>China has reduced its overall BRI lending since 2017 to address its borrowers' debt overhang. However, some countries' outstanding BRI debts are already high enough to require China's debt relief action. With 49% of its external public debt owed to China, Laos can only restore debt sustainability with upfront debt treatment, such as a significant debt reduction in net present value terms (Nishizawa, <span>2023</span>).</p><p>The government policy to address debt distress has distorted the domestic financial system. Domestic payment arrears as a means of government finance eventually turned into “triangle bonds” with negative spreads for the banks holding these bonds. Domestic bonds show another salient distortion. Ten-year government bonds offered an 8.15%-kip coupon rate in December 2023, even under the double-digit inflation since mid-2022.</p><p>The concern about government intervention in the domestic financial system makes Lao nationals prefer holding their wealth in foreign currencies and keeping foreign exchange earnings unbanked. Mieno and Demachi (<span>2024</span>) are silent on the implications of this persistent dollarization for the domestic financial system.</p><p>Structural savings-investment gaps, observed as current account deficits, explain Laos' continued reliance on foreign capital. If such deficits continue, domestic bonds can only partially substitute for foreign capital. Even worse, government bonds may crowd out local private investment. The government's goal should be to take steady steps over the long term toward creating a well-functioning financial system to mobilize domestic savings sufficient to finance productive investment.</p>","PeriodicalId":45430,"journal":{"name":"Asian Economic Policy Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.5000,"publicationDate":"2024-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/aepr.12478","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Comment on “Macroeconomic Imbalance, External Debt, and the Financial System in Laos”\",\"authors\":\"Toshiro Nishizawa\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/aepr.12478\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p>The Lao economy has gradually recovered since mid-2022, helped by a crawl toward prepandemic normalcy with eased mobility restrictions and cross-border economic activity promoted via the Laos–China railway. 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引用次数: 0

摘要

自 2022 年年中以来,老挝经济逐步恢复,这得益于疫前正常化的爬行,流动限制放 松,以及通过老挝-中国铁路促进跨境经济活动。由于人们采取了反动的自我保护措施,如暂时转向自给自足的生活方式,老挝经济在大流行病的逆境中避免了崩溃。然而,货币贬值和燃料价格上涨使 2022-2023 年的物价水平上涨了 73%。拥有外币资产的家庭对冲了通货膨胀,因为同期外币存款按基普计算增长了2.3倍,这对富人和穷人的分配产生了影响。总体而言,尚存的老挝经济面临着宏观经济失衡的问题,2022年底公共债务和公共担保债务占国内生产总值(GDP)的112%为其蒙上了阴影。老挝经济在过去十年中每年增长7%-8%,2018年以后随着政府认识到财政整顿的迫切需要,经济增长放缓至3%-6%。2017年之前的较高增长是由雄心勃勃的基础设施投资驱动的,与此同时,由大规模外国直接投资和平行公共部门借贷资助的对外经常账户赤字不断扩大。尽管政府努力促进制造业的发展,但经济对资源型部门的依赖依然存在。根据老挝统计局的数据,在2015年至2022年期间,农业占国内生产总值的比重从18%逐渐下降到15%,采矿和采石业占国内生产总值的比重从12%下降到7%,但电力占国内生产总值的比重从8%上升到14%。同期,非贸易部门仍占主导地位,服务业占比保持在 40%以上,建筑业占比从 7%增至 12%。制造业面临着劳动力短缺、泰国和中国进口产品竞争激烈等结构性制约因素。老挝和泰国之间一到三倍的最低工资差鼓励老挝工人到泰国就业,泰国是老挝工人最大的跨境目的地,根据国际劳工组织的数据,截至 2023 年中期,有 226 000 名有记录的老挝移民工人在泰国工作。考虑到以资源为基础的部门在老挝经济中的主导地位,Mieno 和 Demachi(2024 年)应该重新审视他们的说法,即对资源诅咒的担忧并不迫在眉睫。由于大量的债务偿还和非银行外汇收入导致的经常账户长期赤字在 2010 年代使外汇储备保持在 6-1 亿美元左右。然而,中国进出口银行自 2020 年起推迟还本付息,并与中国人民银行达成互换安排,这有助于将外汇储备增加到 2023 年 9 月的 18 亿美元。自 2017 年以来,中国已减少了对 "一带一路 "倡议的整体贷款,以解决借款国的债务过剩问题。然而,一些国家尚未偿还的金砖国家债务已经高到需要中国采取债务减免行动的地步。老挝 49% 的外部公共债务是欠中国的,只有通过前期债务处理,如大幅削减净现值债务,才能恢复债务可持续性(Nishizawa,2023 年)。作为政府融资手段的国内支付欠款最终变成了 "三角债券",持有这些债券的银行将获得负利差。国内债券显示出另一种明显的扭曲。2023 年 12 月,即使在 2022 年年中以来通货膨胀率达到两位数的情况下,十年期政府债券的票面利率也达到了 8.15%-基普。Mieno 和 Demachi(2024 年)没有提及这种持续的美元化对国内金融体系的影响。结构性储蓄-投资缺口,即经常账户赤字,是老挝持续依赖外国资本的原因。如果这种赤字继续存在,国内债券只能部分替代外国资本。更糟糕的是,政府债券可能会挤走当地的私人投资。政府的目标应该是采取长期稳定的措施,建立一个运作良好的金融体系,以调动足够的国内储蓄为生产性投资提供资金。
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Comment on “Macroeconomic Imbalance, External Debt, and the Financial System in Laos”

The Lao economy has gradually recovered since mid-2022, helped by a crawl toward prepandemic normalcy with eased mobility restrictions and cross-border economic activity promoted via the Laos–China railway. The economy avoided collapse amid pandemic adversities due to people's reactionary self-protection, such as a temporal shift to a self-sufficient lifestyle. Nevertheless, the currency depreciation and higher fuel prices raised price levels by 73% in 2022–2023. Households with foreign-currency-denominated assets have hedged against inflation, as foreign currency deposits grew 2.3 times in kip terms in the same period, creating distributional impacts for the haves and have-nots. Overall, the surviving Lao economy faces macroeconomic imbalances, overshadowed by a public and publicly guaranteed debt of 112% of gross domestic product (GDP) at the end of 2022.

The Lao economy grew by 7–8% annually over a decade before slowing down to 3–6% in 2018 onward as the government recognized the urgent need for fiscal consolidation. The higher growth until 2017 was driven by ambitious infrastructure investment, synchronized with widening external current account deficits financed by massive foreign direct investment and parallel public sector borrowing. Heightened fiscal and external sector vulnerabilities accompanied this accelerated growth.

Despite the government's efforts to promote the manufacturing sector, the economy's reliance on the resources-based sector persists. According to the Lao Statistics Bureau, between 2015 and 2022 the agricultural share of GDP gradually declined from 18% to 15%, and the mining and quarrying share from 12% to 7%, but the electricity share increased from 8% to 14%. In the same period, the nontradable sector remains dominant, with services remaining above 40% and construction increasing from 7% to 12%. In contrast, the manufacturing sector remained around 9–10%.

Manufacturing faces such structural constraints as labor shortages and competitive imports from Thailand and China. One to three minimum wage differentials between Laos and Thailand encourage Lao workers to pursue jobs in Thailand, the largest cross-border destination for Lao workers with 226,000 documented Lao migrant workers as of mid-2023, according to the International Labour Organization. Industrial diversification is a challenge, except for tourism potential for now.

Considering the resources-based sector's dominance in the Lao economy, Mieno and Demachi (2024) should re-examine their claim that the fear of the resource curse is not imminent.

Chronic current account deficits due to large debt servicing and unbanked foreign exchange earnings kept foreign exchange reserves around US$0.6–1.0 billion in the 2010s. However, the Export–Import Bank of China's debt service deferrals since 2020 and the swap arrangement with the People's Bank of China helped increase the reserves to US$1.8 billion as of September 2023.

Recent research shows that a debt trap narrative vis-à-vis China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is an unfounded myth (Nishizawa, 2023). A debtor trapped with unsustainable debt gets its creditor trapped with unpaid debt.

China has reduced its overall BRI lending since 2017 to address its borrowers' debt overhang. However, some countries' outstanding BRI debts are already high enough to require China's debt relief action. With 49% of its external public debt owed to China, Laos can only restore debt sustainability with upfront debt treatment, such as a significant debt reduction in net present value terms (Nishizawa, 2023).

The government policy to address debt distress has distorted the domestic financial system. Domestic payment arrears as a means of government finance eventually turned into “triangle bonds” with negative spreads for the banks holding these bonds. Domestic bonds show another salient distortion. Ten-year government bonds offered an 8.15%-kip coupon rate in December 2023, even under the double-digit inflation since mid-2022.

The concern about government intervention in the domestic financial system makes Lao nationals prefer holding their wealth in foreign currencies and keeping foreign exchange earnings unbanked. Mieno and Demachi (2024) are silent on the implications of this persistent dollarization for the domestic financial system.

Structural savings-investment gaps, observed as current account deficits, explain Laos' continued reliance on foreign capital. If such deficits continue, domestic bonds can only partially substitute for foreign capital. Even worse, government bonds may crowd out local private investment. The government's goal should be to take steady steps over the long term toward creating a well-functioning financial system to mobilize domestic savings sufficient to finance productive investment.

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期刊介绍: The goal of the Asian Economic Policy Review is to become an intellectual voice on the current issues of international economics and economic policy, based on comprehensive and in-depth analyses, with a primary focus on Asia. Emphasis is placed on identifying key issues at the time - spanning international trade, international finance, the environment, energy, the integration of regional economies and other issues - in order to furnish ideas and proposals to contribute positively to the policy debate in the region.
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