“Nothing Comes about without Interest”: On Hegel’s Account of Moral Motivation

Abstract: Hegel’s account of action in the Encyclopedia defies the standard belief–desire model of action in that he holds that having beliefs is not in itself normative, nor having desires or wishes. At the same time, he argues that our actions are expressive of our reasons to act, including beliefs and practical feelings. By drawing attention on the dialectic between deeds and practical feelings as well as on the role of interest, the author distinguishes two orders of moral motivation in Hegel’s theory of practical spirit: a first-order motivation concerned with self-realization, and a second-order motivation that expresses interest in shared commitments and obligations. Taken together, both types of interest delineate Hegel’s theory of responsive conduct. One upshot of this view is the reevaluation of moral action in terms of processes rather than events, which also makes room for a noncognitivist appraisal of action in Hegel.