还有一个不方便的模态真理

Pub Date : 2024-06-05 DOI:10.1111/theo.12532

Chaoan He

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引用次数: 0

摘要

迪弗斯认为，有些模态真理对于刘易斯的模态理论是不方便的。努南和贾戈提出了对这一挑战的回答，他们援引了对模态真理的重复解释。在此，我将提出一种略有不同的模态真理，即使对于接受努南和贾戈提议的刘易斯主义者来说，这种真理也会被证明是不方便的。

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One more inconvenient modal truth

Divers argued that there are modal truths that are inconvenient for the canonical Lewisian theory of modality. Noonan and Jago proposed an answer to the challenge, by invoking a duplicate interpretation of the modal truths. Here, I present a slightly different kind of modal truth that would prove inconvenient even for a Lewisian who accepts Noonan and Jago's proposal.

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