{"title":"还有一个不方便的模态真理","authors":"Chaoan He","doi":"10.1111/theo.12532","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Divers argued that there are modal truths that are inconvenient for the canonical Lewisian theory of modality. Noonan and Jago proposed an answer to the challenge, by invoking a duplicate interpretation of the modal truths. Here, I present a slightly different kind of modal truth that would prove inconvenient even for a Lewisian who accepts Noonan and Jago's proposal.","PeriodicalId":44638,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6000,"publicationDate":"2024-06-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"One more inconvenient modal truth\",\"authors\":\"Chaoan He\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/theo.12532\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Divers argued that there are modal truths that are inconvenient for the canonical Lewisian theory of modality. Noonan and Jago proposed an answer to the challenge, by invoking a duplicate interpretation of the modal truths. Here, I present a slightly different kind of modal truth that would prove inconvenient even for a Lewisian who accepts Noonan and Jago's proposal.\",\"PeriodicalId\":44638,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"THEORIA\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.6000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-06-05\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"THEORIA\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12532\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q4\",\"JCRName\":\"SOCIOLOGY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"THEORIA","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12532","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"SOCIOLOGY","Score":null,"Total":0}
Divers argued that there are modal truths that are inconvenient for the canonical Lewisian theory of modality. Noonan and Jago proposed an answer to the challenge, by invoking a duplicate interpretation of the modal truths. Here, I present a slightly different kind of modal truth that would prove inconvenient even for a Lewisian who accepts Noonan and Jago's proposal.
期刊介绍：
Since its foundation in 1935, Theoria publishes research in all areas of philosophy. Theoria is committed to precision and clarity in philosophical discussions, and encourages cooperation between philosophy and other disciplines. The journal is not affiliated with any particular school or faction. Instead, it promotes dialogues between different philosophical viewpoints. Theoria is peer-reviewed. It publishes articles, reviews, and shorter notes and discussions. Short discussion notes on recent articles in Theoria are welcome.
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