{"title":"故事仍然不是生活出来的,而是讲出来的","authors":"João Ohara","doi":"10.1163/18722636-12341527","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>In Adrian Currie and Daniel Swaim’s “minimal realism”, the stories we tell about the world can grasp better or worse certain patterns that exist independently of us in the world. Accordingly, from their perspective, disagreements about these stories could at least sometimes be solved by empirical means – by “looking at the world”. In this paper, I offer some reasons why a Minkean narrativist would not be moved by Currie and Swaim’s “minimal realism”, at least when it comes to human history. In short, the Minkean narrativist sees no compelling reasons to assume that the beginnings, middles, and endings of the stories we tell about the world correspond to beginnings, middles, and endings that are inherent in the phenomena themselves. These are not properties of events, but parts of the narrative structure through which we understand certain entities or processes in the world.</p>","PeriodicalId":43541,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Philosophy of History","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.4000,"publicationDate":"2024-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Stories Are Still Not Lived but Told\",\"authors\":\"João Ohara\",\"doi\":\"10.1163/18722636-12341527\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p>In Adrian Currie and Daniel Swaim’s “minimal realism”, the stories we tell about the world can grasp better or worse certain patterns that exist independently of us in the world. Accordingly, from their perspective, disagreements about these stories could at least sometimes be solved by empirical means – by “looking at the world”. In this paper, I offer some reasons why a Minkean narrativist would not be moved by Currie and Swaim’s “minimal realism”, at least when it comes to human history. In short, the Minkean narrativist sees no compelling reasons to assume that the beginnings, middles, and endings of the stories we tell about the world correspond to beginnings, middles, and endings that are inherent in the phenomena themselves. These are not properties of events, but parts of the narrative structure through which we understand certain entities or processes in the world.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":43541,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of the Philosophy of History\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.4000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-06-28\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of the Philosophy of History\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1163/18722636-12341527\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"历史学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"HISTORY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of the Philosophy of History","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18722636-12341527","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"HISTORY","Score":null,"Total":0}
In Adrian Currie and Daniel Swaim’s “minimal realism”, the stories we tell about the world can grasp better or worse certain patterns that exist independently of us in the world. Accordingly, from their perspective, disagreements about these stories could at least sometimes be solved by empirical means – by “looking at the world”. In this paper, I offer some reasons why a Minkean narrativist would not be moved by Currie and Swaim’s “minimal realism”, at least when it comes to human history. In short, the Minkean narrativist sees no compelling reasons to assume that the beginnings, middles, and endings of the stories we tell about the world correspond to beginnings, middles, and endings that are inherent in the phenomena themselves. These are not properties of events, but parts of the narrative structure through which we understand certain entities or processes in the world.
期刊介绍:
Philosophy of history is a rapidly expanding area. There is growing interest today in: what constitutes knowledge of the past, the ontology of past events, the relationship of language to the past, and the nature of representations of the past. These interests are distinct from – although connected with – contemporary epistemology, philosophy of science, metaphysics, philosophy of language, and aesthetics. Hence we need a distinct venue in which philosophers can explore these issues. Journal of the Philosophy of History provides such a venue. Ever since neo-Kantianism, philosophy of history has been central to all of philosophy, whether or not particular philosophers recognized its potential significance.