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引用次数: 0
摘要
非环境与社会(ES)基金家族必须在兼顾其所宣传的利益相关者利益和最大化其家族所青睐的股东价值之间取得平衡。我们发现,这些基金支持的环境与社会提案与多数门槛相去甚远,而当其投票更有可能起到关键作用时,则会反对这些提案。这种策略的结果是,基金平均支持ES提案的比例很高,这似乎符合其受托责任,同时反对有争议的ES提案。这种 "洗绿 "策略是由非环境基金家族中面向机构投资者的环境基金推动的。事实上,当这些基金对环境经济提案的平均支持率较低时,其资金流入量也较低。这种策略性投票在治理提案中没有表现出来,ES 家族中的 ES 基金或非 ES 家族中的非 ES 基金也没有表现出来,这加强了策略性投票的概念,即在满足家族偏好的同时似乎履行了基金的受托人责任。JEL:G11, G30, K22, M14
Mutual Funds’ Strategic Voting on Environmental and Social Issues
Environmental and social (ES) funds in non-ES families must balance incorporating the stakeholders’ interests they advertise and maximizing shareholder value favored by their families. We find that these funds support ES proposals that are far from the majority threshold, while opposing them when their vote is more likely to be pivotal. This strategy results in a high average support for ES proposals, seemingly consistent with their fiduciary responsibilities, while opposing contested ES proposals. This greenwashing strategy is driven by ES funds in non-ES families who cater to institutional investors. Indeed, these funds experience lower inflows when providing low average support for ES proposals. This strategic voting is not exhibited in governance proposals, nor by ES funds in ES families or by non-ES funds in non-ES families, reinforcing the notion of strategic voting to accommodate family preferences while appearing to meet the fiduciaries responsibilities of the funds. JEL: G11, G30, K22, M14
期刊介绍:
The Review of Finance, the official journal of the European Finance Association, aims at a wide circulation and visibility in the finance profession. The journal publishes high-quality papers in all areas of financial economics, both established and newly developing fields: • •Asset pricing •Corporate finance •Banking and market microstructure •Law and finance •Behavioral finance •Experimental finance Review of Finance occasionally publishes special issues on timely topics, including selected papers presented at the meetings of the European Finance Association or at other selected conferences in the field.