呼唤 "Gevald":论党派传播中出现的负面选举预测

IF 1.7 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Experimental Economics Pub Date : 2024-07-09 DOI:10.1007/s10683-024-09835-z
Eldad Yechiam, Dana Zeif
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摘要

研究发现,个人会匿名预测其心仪候选人的积极选举结果。然而,对于在同阵营政治沟通(即党派沟通)背景下做出的选举预测,我们却知之甚少,因为这些预测可能是为了鼓励其他支持者。在五项关于低信息量选举的研究和一项关于假设性美国选举的研究(n = 1889)中,我们发现,与中立观点和实际选举结果相比,人们倾向于向其他与自己观点相同的人传达有利的预测。另一方面,负面框架降低了这些交流中预测的积极性,以至于导致大多数参与者预测选举失败。这种情况发生在单个受访者采取不一致行动的情况下,而当选举结果被表述为下降时,这种情况更为强烈。当同时存在积极和消极两种框架选项时,尽管只有少数人选择了消极框架选项,但这种消极性仍然影响了参与者的预测。因此,人们倾向于在党派通讯中做出乐观的选举预测,但如果预测提示发生微妙的变化,这种模式很容易被操纵,无论是通过负面框架还是可选择的正面和负面框架。
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Calling “Gevald”: on the emergence of negative election forecasts in partisan communications

Individuals were found to anonymously predict positive election outcomes for their preferred candidate. Yet, there is little scientific knowledge about election predictions made in the context of same-camp political communications (i.e., partisan communications) that are presumably meant to encourage other supporters. In five studies of low-information elections and a study of hypothetical U.S. elections (n = 1889), we found that people tended to communicate favorable forecasts to others sharing their view, compared to the neutral point and to the actual election outcomes. On the other hand, negative framing reduced the positivity of forecasts in these communications to the extent that it led most participants to predict an election loss. This occurred in response to a single addressee acting discordantly and even more strongly when the election results were phrased as a drop. When both positive and negative framing options were available, this still negativity affected participants’ predictions even though only a minority selected the negative framing option. Thus, people tend to make optimistic election predictions in partisan communications, but this pattern is easily manipulable given subtle changes in the forecasting prompt, either by negative framing or selectable positive and negative framing.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
4.10
自引率
8.70%
发文量
40
期刊介绍: Experimental methods are uniquely suited to the study of many phenomena that have been difficult to observe directly in naturally occurring economic contexts. For example, the ability to induce preferences and control information structures makes it possible to isolate the effects of alternate economic structures, policies, and market institutions.Experimental Economics is an international journal that serves the growing group of economists around the world who use experimental methods. The journal invites high-quality papers in any area of experimental research in economics and related fields (i.e. accounting, finance, political science, and the psychology of decision making). State-of-the-art theoretical work and econometric work that is motivated by experimental data is also encouraged. The journal will also consider articles with a primary focus on methodology or replication of controversial findings. We welcome experiments conducted in either the laboratory or in the field. The relevant data can be decisions or non-choice data such as physiological measurements. However, we only consider studies that do not employ deception of participants and in which participants are incentivized.  Experimental Economics is structured to promote experimental economics by bringing together innovative research that meets professional standards of experimental method, but without editorial bias towards specific orientations. All papers will be reviewed through the standard, anonymous-referee procedure and all accepted manuscripts will be subject to the approval of two editors. Authors must submit the instructions that participants in their study received at the time of submission of their manuscript. Authors are expected to submit separate data appendices which will be attached to the journal''s web page upon publication. Officially cited as: Exp Econ
期刊最新文献
Rational inattention in games: experimental evidence Sequential search with a price freeze option: theory and experimental evidence Measuring decision confidence Calling “Gevald”: on the emergence of negative election forecasts in partisan communications Blame and praise: responsibility attribution patterns in decision chains
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