探索债务的代理成本:风险、信息流和首席执行官的社会关系

IF 1.9 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting Pub Date : 2024-07-10 DOI:10.1007/s11156-024-01312-1
Md Miran Hossain, David Javakhadze, David A. Maslar, Maya Thevenot
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引用次数: 0

摘要

与之前关注私人贷款和银行债务的研究结果相反,我们发现 CEO 社会资本的增加与公司的公共债务成本呈正相关。对于陷入财务困境的企业和违约概率较高且增加股息的企业,这种影响尤为明显。在研究其影响渠道时,我们发现社会资本与限制性契约的减少使用有关,而限制性契约的减少使用会放大公司的债务成本。总之,这些结果支持风险转移的观点,认为这是一种合理的机制。在考虑社会资本的替代代用指标、替代模型规格和内生性检验时,我们的研究结果仍然是稳健的。
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Exploring the agency cost of debt: risk, information flow, and CEO social ties

Contrary to the findings of prior research that focuses on private loans and bank debt, we find that greater CEO social capital is positively associated with a firm’s cost of public debt. This effect is particularly pronounced for firms in financial distress and firms with a higher probability of default that increase dividends. Examining the channel, we demonstrate that social capital is associated with a reduced use of restrictive covenants, which subsequently amplifies the firm's cost of debt. Collectively, the results support the risk-shifting perspective as a plausible mechanism. Our findings remain robust when considering alternative proxies for social capital, alternative model specifications, and tests for endogeneity.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
3.20
自引率
17.60%
发文量
87
期刊介绍: Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting deals with research involving the interaction of finance with accounting, economics, and quantitative methods, focused on finance and accounting. The papers published present useful theoretical and methodological results with the support of interesting empirical applications. Purely theoretical and methodological research with the potential for important applications is also published. Besides the traditional high-quality theoretical and empirical research in finance, the journal also publishes papers dealing with interdisciplinary topics.
期刊最新文献
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