填充与修剪:投票异质性下的选区划分

IF 0.5 4区 经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS Social Choice and Welfare Pub Date : 2024-07-09 DOI:10.1007/s00355-024-01536-z
Andrei Gomberg, Romans Pancs, Tridib Sharma
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引用次数: 0

摘要

填充是指在选区中加入非选民(如非公民或被剥夺选举权的囚犯),以确保选区符合一人一票原则规定的规模配额,同时又不影响选区的投票结果。我们展示了 "填充 "及其镜像 "剪枝 "如何导致民选立法机构的社会最优构成出现任意大的偏差。我们解决了党派选区最优填充问题。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。

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Padding and pruning: gerrymandering under turnout heterogeneity

Padding is the practice of adding nonvoters (e.g., noncitizens or disenfranchised prisoners) to an electoral district in order to ensure that the district meets the size quota prescribed by the one man, one vote doctrine without affecting the voting outcome in the district. We show how padding— and its mirror image, pruning—, can lead to arbitrarily large deviations from the socially optimal composition of elected legislatures. We solve the partisan districter’s optimal padding problem.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.60
自引率
11.10%
发文量
56
期刊介绍: Social Choice and Welfare explores all aspects, both normative and positive, of welfare economics, collective choice, and strategic interaction. Topics include but are not limited to: preference aggregation, welfare criteria, fairness, justice and equity, rights, inequality and poverty measurement, voting and elections, political games, coalition formation, public goods, mechanism design, networks, matching, optimal taxation, cost-benefit analysis, computational social choice, judgement aggregation, market design, behavioral welfare economics, subjective well-being studies and experimental investigations related to social choice and voting. As such, the journal is inter-disciplinary and cuts across the boundaries of economics, political science, philosophy, and mathematics. Articles on choice and order theory that include results that can be applied to the above topics are also included in the journal. While it emphasizes theory, the journal also publishes empirical work in the subject area reflecting cross-fertilizing between theoretical and empirical research. Readers will find original research articles, surveys, and book reviews.Officially cited as: Soc Choice Welf
期刊最新文献
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