{"title":"当个人政治变成公共政治:公务员制度的保护措施能保护政府工作人员吗?","authors":"Morgan Foy","doi":"10.1257/app.20220723","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines whether the civil service system protected state bureaucrats from political interference following a recall petition against the governor of Wisconsin. I find that most classified workers, who were covered by the state civil service laws, were paid equally by signing status following the public disclosure of the petition list. Conversely, signers in the unclassified service, a smaller set of government positions, were paid about 3 percent less annually relative to nonsigners in the postdisclosure period. These results indicate that the civil service insulated qualified bureaucrats, while uncovered workers faced retribution. (JEL D72, D73, H75, H83, J31, J45)","PeriodicalId":518829,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal: Applied Economics","volume":"20 11","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"When Individual Politics Become Public: Do Civil Service Protections Insulate Government Workers?\",\"authors\":\"Morgan Foy\",\"doi\":\"10.1257/app.20220723\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This paper examines whether the civil service system protected state bureaucrats from political interference following a recall petition against the governor of Wisconsin. I find that most classified workers, who were covered by the state civil service laws, were paid equally by signing status following the public disclosure of the petition list. Conversely, signers in the unclassified service, a smaller set of government positions, were paid about 3 percent less annually relative to nonsigners in the postdisclosure period. These results indicate that the civil service insulated qualified bureaucrats, while uncovered workers faced retribution. (JEL D72, D73, H75, H83, J31, J45)\",\"PeriodicalId\":518829,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"American Economic Journal: Applied Economics\",\"volume\":\"20 11\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-07-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"American Economic Journal: Applied Economics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20220723\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"American Economic Journal: Applied Economics","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20220723","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
When Individual Politics Become Public: Do Civil Service Protections Insulate Government Workers?
This paper examines whether the civil service system protected state bureaucrats from political interference following a recall petition against the governor of Wisconsin. I find that most classified workers, who were covered by the state civil service laws, were paid equally by signing status following the public disclosure of the petition list. Conversely, signers in the unclassified service, a smaller set of government positions, were paid about 3 percent less annually relative to nonsigners in the postdisclosure period. These results indicate that the civil service insulated qualified bureaucrats, while uncovered workers faced retribution. (JEL D72, D73, H75, H83, J31, J45)