{"title":"康德的认知理论与实践旨趣:论《康德全集》中表象与事物的区分","authors":"Aliki Lavranu","doi":"10.53656/phil2024-02-03","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The article examines the significance of the distinction between phenomena and things in themselves for the foundation of Kantian practical reason. It holds that this distinction acquires its full meaning and the entire gamut of its validity only in the sphere of practical reason. In this way, it attempts to show that the Kantian epistemological distinctions and the fundamental steps in the construction of the Critique of Pure Reason are at the same time strategies to support practical reason, thus driven by an emphatically “practical interest”.","PeriodicalId":53786,"journal":{"name":"Filosofiya-Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1000,"publicationDate":"2024-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Theory of Cognition and Practical Interest in Kant: on the Distinction Between Appearance and Thing in Itslef\",\"authors\":\"Aliki Lavranu\",\"doi\":\"10.53656/phil2024-02-03\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The article examines the significance of the distinction between phenomena and things in themselves for the foundation of Kantian practical reason. It holds that this distinction acquires its full meaning and the entire gamut of its validity only in the sphere of practical reason. In this way, it attempts to show that the Kantian epistemological distinctions and the fundamental steps in the construction of the Critique of Pure Reason are at the same time strategies to support practical reason, thus driven by an emphatically “practical interest”.\",\"PeriodicalId\":53786,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Filosofiya-Philosophy\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.1000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-07-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Filosofiya-Philosophy\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.53656/phil2024-02-03\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"N/A\",\"JCRName\":\"PHILOSOPHY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Filosofiya-Philosophy","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.53656/phil2024-02-03","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"N/A","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
Theory of Cognition and Practical Interest in Kant: on the Distinction Between Appearance and Thing in Itslef
The article examines the significance of the distinction between phenomena and things in themselves for the foundation of Kantian practical reason. It holds that this distinction acquires its full meaning and the entire gamut of its validity only in the sphere of practical reason. In this way, it attempts to show that the Kantian epistemological distinctions and the fundamental steps in the construction of the Critique of Pure Reason are at the same time strategies to support practical reason, thus driven by an emphatically “practical interest”.