{"title":"墨西哥的国家、犯罪和暴力,1920-2000 年:有罪不罚的仲裁者,强制的代理人","authors":"Tom Long, Benjamin T Smith","doi":"10.1093/pastj/gtad032","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The nature of the relationships among the Mexican state, organized crime and violence is much debated. Many accounts of state formation suggest that states increase their extractive and coercive capabilities in tandem: they monopolize the provision of ‘protection’ in Charles Tilly’s famous analogy. However, when unconsolidated states confront lucrative, illicit markets, state-building takes an unexpected turn. We argue that these states, like post-revolutionary Mexico, develop not as one protection racket, but as two. While the orthodox or licit protection racket collects tax from businesses and individuals in return for the protection of property and persons, the illicit protection racket (like that of a traditional mafia organization) collects extortion money from criminal groups in return for protection from prosecution. Though we use the case study of Mexico to tease out these conclusions, we argue that they can just as easily be applied to other states with weak tax bases, limited geographical reach, and profitable illicit markets.","PeriodicalId":47870,"journal":{"name":"Past & Present","volume":"54 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8000,"publicationDate":"2024-07-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"State, crime and violence in Mexico, 1920–2000: Arbiters of impunity, agents of coercion\",\"authors\":\"Tom Long, Benjamin T Smith\",\"doi\":\"10.1093/pastj/gtad032\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The nature of the relationships among the Mexican state, organized crime and violence is much debated. Many accounts of state formation suggest that states increase their extractive and coercive capabilities in tandem: they monopolize the provision of ‘protection’ in Charles Tilly’s famous analogy. However, when unconsolidated states confront lucrative, illicit markets, state-building takes an unexpected turn. We argue that these states, like post-revolutionary Mexico, develop not as one protection racket, but as two. While the orthodox or licit protection racket collects tax from businesses and individuals in return for the protection of property and persons, the illicit protection racket (like that of a traditional mafia organization) collects extortion money from criminal groups in return for protection from prosecution. Though we use the case study of Mexico to tease out these conclusions, we argue that they can just as easily be applied to other states with weak tax bases, limited geographical reach, and profitable illicit markets.\",\"PeriodicalId\":47870,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Past & Present\",\"volume\":\"54 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.8000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-07-27\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Past & Present\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"98\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1093/pastj/gtad032\",\"RegionNum\":1,\"RegionCategory\":\"历史学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"HISTORY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Past & Present","FirstCategoryId":"98","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/pastj/gtad032","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"HISTORY","Score":null,"Total":0}
State, crime and violence in Mexico, 1920–2000: Arbiters of impunity, agents of coercion
The nature of the relationships among the Mexican state, organized crime and violence is much debated. Many accounts of state formation suggest that states increase their extractive and coercive capabilities in tandem: they monopolize the provision of ‘protection’ in Charles Tilly’s famous analogy. However, when unconsolidated states confront lucrative, illicit markets, state-building takes an unexpected turn. We argue that these states, like post-revolutionary Mexico, develop not as one protection racket, but as two. While the orthodox or licit protection racket collects tax from businesses and individuals in return for the protection of property and persons, the illicit protection racket (like that of a traditional mafia organization) collects extortion money from criminal groups in return for protection from prosecution. Though we use the case study of Mexico to tease out these conclusions, we argue that they can just as easily be applied to other states with weak tax bases, limited geographical reach, and profitable illicit markets.
期刊介绍:
Founded in 1952, Past & Present is widely acknowledged to be the liveliest and most stimulating historical journal in the English-speaking world. The journal offers: •A wide variety of scholarly and original articles on historical, social and cultural change in all parts of the world. •Four issues a year, each containing five or six major articles plus occasional debates and review essays. •Challenging work by young historians as well as seminal articles by internationally regarded scholars. •A range of articles that appeal to specialists and non-specialists, and communicate the results of the most recent historical research in a readable and lively form. •A forum for debate, encouraging productive controversy.