客观还是偏见?首席执行官的过度自信与记者的报道

Rong Gong
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本研究探讨了记者对过度自信的首席执行官(CEO)所进行的收购活动的报道,与对过度自信程度较低的首席执行官(CEO)所进行的收购活动的报道相比,前者更积极还是后者更消极。研究结果表明,记者对首席执行官过于自信的公司进行的收购事件的负面报道多于对首席执行官不过于自信的公司进行的收购事件的负面报道。同时,在市场不确定性较高的时期,记者对过度自信的首席执行官进行收购的负面报道会有所缓解。这一结果表明,记者并没有因为过度自信的首席执行官所展示的积极前景而产生向上的偏见,而是充当了信息中介的角色,向读者宣传过度自信的首席执行官过于乐观的观点。
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Objective or biased? CEO overconfidence and journalists' coverage
This study explores whether journalists report more positively or negatively on acquisitions by chief executive officers (CEOs) with greater overconfidence than those with less overconfident CEOs. The results show that journalists report acquisition events conducted by firms with overconfident CEOs more negatively than those without. Meanwhile, journalists' negativity in reporting acquisitions by overconfident CEOs is mitigated during periods of high market uncertainty. This result suggests that journalists are not biased upward because of the positive prospects presented by overconfident CEOs but instead act as information intermediaries to inform readers about the overoptimistic view of overconfident CEOs.
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