Hyeesoo (Sally) Chung, Jong-Yu Paula Hao, Jinyoung Wynn
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引用次数: 0
摘要
本文旨在研究高管薪酬激励机制，特别是首席执行官内债持有量，对行业专业审计师选择的影响。设计/方法/途径高内债持有量有望限制管理者过度冒险，并使管理者和外部债务人的利益保持一致。作者假设，债务人对征用的担忧减少会降低对高审计质量（以行业专业化衡量）的需求。作者使用 OLS 回归方法对 2006 年至 2018 年的美国公司样本进行了调查，并使用 CEO 的相对杠杆率来替代 CEO 持有的内部债务。作者还进行了额外的两阶段最小二乘法回归分析，以解决潜在的内生性问题。研究结果本文发现，首席执行官内债水平较高的公司往往不会任命具有行业专业性的审计师。这一结果与内债缓解了管理者与债务人之间的代理冲突，从而降低了对高质量审计作为一种监督机制的需求这一观点是一致的。本文还发现，在杠杆率过高的公司中，首席执行官内债水平较高的公司倾向于任命行业专家审计师。 原创性/价值 研究结果表明，首席执行官内债对行业专家审计师的需求既有替代效应，也有互补效应，从而为有关代理成本和审计师选择的文献做出了贡献。
This paper aims to examine the effect of executive compensation incentives, specifically CEO inside debt holdings, on the choice of industry specialist auditor.
Design/methodology/approach
High inside debt holdings are expected to constrain excessive managerial risk-taking and align the interests of managers and outside debtholders. The authors hypothesize that reduced debtholders’ expropriation concerns will decrease the demand for high audit quality, measured by industry specialization. The authors investigate a sample of US firms from 2006 to 2018 using OLS regression and use CEO relative leverage to proxy for CEO inside debt holdings. The authors conduct an additional two-stage least squares regression analysis to address potential endogeneity issues.
Findings
The paper finds that firms with higher levels of CEO inside debt tend not to appoint an auditor with industry specialization. This result is consistent with the notion that inside debt mitigates agency conflicts between managers and debtholders, reducing the demand for high-quality audits as a monitoring mechanism. The paper also finds that among firms which are excessively leveraged, those with higher levels of CEO inside debt tend to appoint an industry specialist auditor.
Originality/value
The findings contribute to the literature on agency cost and auditor choice by demonstrating that CEO inside debt has both substitutive and complementary effects on demand for industry specialist auditors.
期刊介绍：
The key areas addressed are: ■Audit and Assurance (financial and non-financial) ■Financial and Managerial Reporting ■Governance, controls, risks and ethics ■Organizational issues including firm cultures, performance and development In addition, the evaluation of changes occurring in the auditing profession, as well as the broader fields of accounting and assurance, are also explored. Debates concerning organizational performance and professional competence are also covered.
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