{"title":"什么是法律的理想维度?","authors":"Lorenz Kaehler","doi":"10.1111/raju.12413","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Various authors have claimed that law has an ideal dimension owed to a claim to correctness. Against this thesis, this article argues that there are several ideal dimensions of law, namely, a moral, a legal, and an ontological one. All of them are independent of a claim to correctness. This claim can be understood in a strong and a weak way. Both versions are wanting because law claims neither that it is morally ideal nor that it is not grossly unjust. Consequently, the ideal dimension of law has to be found in features other than in a claim to correctness.","PeriodicalId":45892,"journal":{"name":"Ratio Juris","volume":"245 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6000,"publicationDate":"2024-07-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"What Is the Ideal Dimension of Law?\",\"authors\":\"Lorenz Kaehler\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/raju.12413\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Various authors have claimed that law has an ideal dimension owed to a claim to correctness. Against this thesis, this article argues that there are several ideal dimensions of law, namely, a moral, a legal, and an ontological one. All of them are independent of a claim to correctness. This claim can be understood in a strong and a weak way. Both versions are wanting because law claims neither that it is morally ideal nor that it is not grossly unjust. Consequently, the ideal dimension of law has to be found in features other than in a claim to correctness.\",\"PeriodicalId\":45892,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Ratio Juris\",\"volume\":\"245 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.6000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-07-24\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Ratio Juris\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1111/raju.12413\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"LAW\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Ratio Juris","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1111/raju.12413","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
Various authors have claimed that law has an ideal dimension owed to a claim to correctness. Against this thesis, this article argues that there are several ideal dimensions of law, namely, a moral, a legal, and an ontological one. All of them are independent of a claim to correctness. This claim can be understood in a strong and a weak way. Both versions are wanting because law claims neither that it is morally ideal nor that it is not grossly unjust. Consequently, the ideal dimension of law has to be found in features other than in a claim to correctness.