{"title":"体制机会主义:选举运气如何影响拉丁美洲对权力分享体制的偏好","authors":"Santiago Alles","doi":"10.1111/lsq.12472","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Drawing on approximately 4000 face‐to‐face interviews with lower house members from seventeen Latin American countries, this article demonstrates how partisan considerations shape legislators' preferences for power‐sharing institutions. Distributive models argue that reforming parties derive preferences based on potential advantages in power allocation, yet the role of individual legislators remains underexplored. The evidence reveals that legislators favor institutional arrangements that maximize their party's influence. Representatives from larger parties prefer electoral rules that reduce the number of parties in the House, while incumbent lawmakers support a stronger executive. Notably, party positions often shift following changes in electoral fortunes: Parties become more favorable of proportional representation after losing seats and advocate for reinforced congressional authority upon leaving office.","PeriodicalId":47672,"journal":{"name":"Legislative Studies Quarterly","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4000,"publicationDate":"2024-07-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Institutional opportunism: How electoral fortunes shape preferences for power‐sharing institutions in Latin America\",\"authors\":\"Santiago Alles\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/lsq.12472\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Drawing on approximately 4000 face‐to‐face interviews with lower house members from seventeen Latin American countries, this article demonstrates how partisan considerations shape legislators' preferences for power‐sharing institutions. Distributive models argue that reforming parties derive preferences based on potential advantages in power allocation, yet the role of individual legislators remains underexplored. The evidence reveals that legislators favor institutional arrangements that maximize their party's influence. Representatives from larger parties prefer electoral rules that reduce the number of parties in the House, while incumbent lawmakers support a stronger executive. Notably, party positions often shift following changes in electoral fortunes: Parties become more favorable of proportional representation after losing seats and advocate for reinforced congressional authority upon leaving office.\",\"PeriodicalId\":47672,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Legislative Studies Quarterly\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.4000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-07-21\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Legislative Studies Quarterly\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"90\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.12472\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"社会学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"POLITICAL SCIENCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Legislative Studies Quarterly","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.12472","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"POLITICAL SCIENCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
Institutional opportunism: How electoral fortunes shape preferences for power‐sharing institutions in Latin America
Drawing on approximately 4000 face‐to‐face interviews with lower house members from seventeen Latin American countries, this article demonstrates how partisan considerations shape legislators' preferences for power‐sharing institutions. Distributive models argue that reforming parties derive preferences based on potential advantages in power allocation, yet the role of individual legislators remains underexplored. The evidence reveals that legislators favor institutional arrangements that maximize their party's influence. Representatives from larger parties prefer electoral rules that reduce the number of parties in the House, while incumbent lawmakers support a stronger executive. Notably, party positions often shift following changes in electoral fortunes: Parties become more favorable of proportional representation after losing seats and advocate for reinforced congressional authority upon leaving office.
期刊介绍:
The Legislative Studies Quarterly is an international journal devoted to the publication of research on representative assemblies. Its purpose is to disseminate scholarly work on parliaments and legislatures, their relations to other political institutions, their functions in the political system, and the activities of their members both within the institution and outside. Contributions are invited from scholars in all countries. The pages of the Quarterly are open to all research approaches consistent with the normal canons of scholarship, and to work on representative assemblies in all settings and all time periods. The aim of the journal is to contribute to the formulation and verification of general theories about legislative systems, processes, and behavior.