保护劳工权利:品牌企业与供应商之间的合同设计与协调

IF 6 2区 管理学 Q1 OPERATIONS RESEARCH & MANAGEMENT SCIENCE European Journal of Operational Research Pub Date : 2024-07-25 DOI:10.1016/j.ejor.2024.07.025
Yanju Zhou , Hongzhen Lai , Xiaohong Chen , Chunhua Hu
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文探讨了旨在协调品牌企业及其供应商集体保护供应商劳工权益的合同设计。研究发现,单边成本分摊合同可以激励供应商保护劳工权益,同时提高品牌企业及其供应商的利润。然而,由于对参与双方的激励不足,这种合同无法协调供应链。该合同的两个改进合同可以在一定条件下协调品牌企业及其供应商提高保护劳工权益的力度,但却无法实现协调。因此,本研究提出了成本与收益共享的双边契约。结果表明,在适当的收益分享比例下,该合同能有效鼓励品牌企业及其供应商参与劳动权益保护,协调供应链。此外,亲社会消费者比例的增加也会激励品牌企业及其供应商改善劳工权益。然而,消费者过度依赖品牌商誉来评价整个供应链在保护劳工权益方面所做的努力,会降低他们的努力程度。最后,随着劳工权益保护工作对参考价格影响的增加,会刺激品牌企业和供应商增加对改善劳工权益的投资。在这种高影响水平下,集中模式的参考价格可能会超过单边成本分摊合同的参考价格。但是,如果供应链成员在保护劳工权益方面投入的精力很少,这种影响的增加可能会降低消费者的参考价格。
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Protecting labor rights: Contract design and coordination between brand firms and suppliers

This paper explores the design of a contract aimed at coordinating brand firms and their suppliers to collectively protect the suppliers’ labor rights. It finds that a unilateral cost-sharing contract can incentivize suppliers to protect labor rights, while improving the profits of both brand firms and their suppliers. However, such a contract fails to coordinate the supply chain because of an insufficient incentive for both involved parties. Two improved contracts of this contract can coordinate brands firms and their suppliers to improve their efforts to protect labor rights under certain conditions while failing to achieve coordination. Accordingly, this research proposes a bilateral cost- and revenue-sharing contract. The results indicate that with an appropriate revenue-sharing proportion, this contract effectively encourages brand firms and their suppliers to participate in protecting labor rights and coordinate the supply chain. In addition, an increase in the proportion of prosocial consumers incentivizes brand firms and their suppliers to improve labor rights. Nonetheless, consumers’ excessive reliance on brand goodwill to evaluate the total supply chain efforts to protect labor rights will reduce their efforts. Finally, as the impact of labor rights protection efforts on reference prices increases, it can stimulate brand companies and suppliers to increase investment in improving labor rights. At this high impact level, the reference price in the centralized model may surpass that in the unilateral cost-sharing contract. However, if supply chain members invest little effort to protect labor rights, the increase in this impact could reduce consumers’ reference price.

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来源期刊
European Journal of Operational Research
European Journal of Operational Research 管理科学-运筹学与管理科学
CiteScore
11.90
自引率
9.40%
发文量
786
审稿时长
8.2 months
期刊介绍: The European Journal of Operational Research (EJOR) publishes high quality, original papers that contribute to the methodology of operational research (OR) and to the practice of decision making.
期刊最新文献
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