有固定回报的多目标博弈中的α核心

IF 0.5 4区经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2024-07-20 DOI:10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.07.001

Qi-Qing Song , Min Guo , Xin-Yi Chi

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引用次数: 0

摘要

对于 α 核心形式的合作均衡，通常效用博弈的均衡性和联盟 C 安全性被扩展到了非连续报酬集博弈。建立了这些博弈的 α 核心的存在性，从而可以推导出正常形式博弈的一些典型结果。对于连续博弈，引入了一种类似于准凹的集合报酬。根据引入的集合报酬，还得到了 α 核心的存在性。我们给出了一些例子来验证这些结果。与参考文献中现有结果的比较表明，引入的条件是保证有集合报酬博弈的 α 核心存在的新条件。

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The α-core in a multi-objective game with set payoffs

For the cooperative equilibria in $α$ -core form, the balancedness and coalitionally $C -$ security of games with usual utilities are extended to the games with discontinuous set payoffs. The existence of $α -$ core for these games is established, which can deduce some typical results for normal form games. For continuous games, a quasi-concave-like set payoff is introduced. Based on the introduced set payoffs, the existence of $α -$ core is also obtained. Examples are given to verify these results. Comparison with existing results in references shows that the introduced conditions are new to guarantee the existence of $α -$ core for games with set payoffs.

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来源期刊

Mathematical Social Sciences 数学-数学跨学科应用

CiteScore

1.30

自引率

0.00%

发文量

审稿时长

59 days

期刊介绍： The international, interdisciplinary journal Mathematical Social Sciences publishes original research articles, survey papers, short notes and book reviews. The journal emphasizes the unity of mathematical modelling in economics, psychology, political sciences, sociology and other social sciences. Topics of particular interest include the fundamental aspects of choice, information, and preferences (decision science) and of interaction (game theory and economic theory), the measurement of utility, welfare and inequality, the formal theories of justice and implementation, voting rules, cooperative games, fair division, cost allocation, bargaining, matching, social networks, and evolutionary and other dynamics models. Papers published by the journal are mathematically rigorous but no bounds, from above or from below, limits their technical level. All mathematical techniques may be used. The articles should be self-contained and readable by social scientists trained in mathematics.

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