初创企业收购、战略研发以及新进入者和在位者的创新方向

IF 1.2 4区 管理学 Q3 ECONOMICS Journal of Economics & Management Strategy Pub Date : 2024-07-29 DOI:10.1111/jems.12606
Esmée S. R. Dijk, José L. Moraga‐González, Evgenia Motchenkova
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引用次数: 0

摘要

一个新进入者和一个在位者在竞争市场和非竞争市场之间分配研究资金。收购的前景会扭曲双方分配资金的动机。允许收购可能会改善双方的创新方向和消费者剩余。在条件允许的情况下,在位者预计竞争对手市场存在垄断租金,因此会将研发转向该市场。这种 "在位者买断 "效应降低了进入者从可竞争市场获得的租金,使其有动力将研发资源从竞争市场转移到其他市场。研发市场中的这种战略互动对评估新创企业收购具有重要意义。
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Start‐up acquisitions, strategic R&D, and the entrant's and incumbent's direction of innovation
An entrant and an incumbent allocate their research funds across a rival and a non‐rival market. The prospect of an acquisition distorts both players' incentives to allocate funding. Allowing for acquisitions may improve both players' innovation direction and consumer surplus. Under conditions, the incumbent, anticipating monopolization rents in the rival market, moves R&D towards that market. This “incumbency for buyout” effect lowers the rents the entrant obtains from the contestable market, which gives it incentives to move R&D resources away from the rival market. Such strategic interaction in the R&D market has implications for the assessment of start‐up acquisitions.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
3.20
自引率
5.30%
发文量
43
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