National culture and capital structure dynamics

PurposeWe expand the recent literature on the dynamics of capital structure decisions by investigating the impact of national culture on firms' optimal debt ratios and their dynamic re-adjustment process. To this end, we aim at estimating firm-specific speeds of leverage adjustment, allowing for heterogeneous dynamics in firms' capital structure.Design/methodology/approachWe use dynamic panel data estimators to analyze the impact of cultural factors on the dynamics of debt ratios.FindingsWe show that national culture affects the optimal level of leverage and the dynamic rebalancing of debt ratios, both directly and indirectly, by altering the effect of firm characteristics and macroeconomic factors on firms' financing behavior. Firms converge faster towards the optimal leverage in countries with a stronger attitude to conform with the norm, while they are slower where there is a higher propensity to intellectual autonomy. A higher risk aversion and long-run propensity induce over-levered firms to reduce leverage faster, making the adjustment process strongly asymmetric. Moreover, national culture also produces indirect effects by mitigating the impact of asymmetric information on capital structure decisions. Indeed, firms in more individualistic countries display a lower speed of adjustment and a stronger effect of firm characteristics associated with higher agency costs. On the contrary, firms in countries with a higher tendency to conform to social norms, less individualistic and more long-term oriented have a higher adjustment speed and appear to suffer less from agency issues. Our results therefore highlight how national culture affects agency problems within firms, thus suggesting the adoption of country-specific corporate governance provisions accounting for the effects of local cultural traits on managers' behavior.Originality/valueWe expand the capital structure and governance literature by showing how cultural traits impact on the dynamics of debt ratios. In particular, we show how cultural traits may mitigate or exacerbate the role of agency issues on firms' behavior, hence suggesting that cultural factors may interact with governance rules in shaping firms' decisions. Therefore, our work highlights how policy-makers should include cultural aspects when defining regulation concerning corporate governance.