Ata Atay, Sylvain Funck, Ana Mauleon, Vincent Vannetelbosch
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引用次数: 0
摘要
我们采用远视稳定集的概念来确定，在有配偶的匹配市场中，当代理人有远见时，哪些匹配是稳定的。我们证明，当且仅当匹配稳定时，单子匹配才是远视稳定集。因此，当代理人变得有远见时，与近视代理人稳定的匹配仍然是稳定的。我们为有稳定匹配和无稳定匹配的市场提供了包含多个非稳定匹配的远视稳定集的例子。对于不存在远视稳定集的耦合市场，我们提出了 DEM 远视稳定集来预测代理人远视时稳定的匹配。
We adopt the notion of the farsighted stable set to determine which matchings are stable when agents are farsighted in matching markets with couples. We show that a singleton matching is a farsighted stable set if and only if the matching is stable. Thus, matchings that are stable with myopic agents remain stable when agents become farsighted. Examples of farsighted stable sets containing multiple non-stable matchings are provided for markets with and without stable matchings. For couples markets where the farsighted stable set does not exist, we propose the DEM farsighted stable set to predict the matchings that are stable when agents are farsighted.
期刊介绍：
Social Choice and Welfare explores all aspects, both normative and positive, of welfare economics, collective choice, and strategic interaction. Topics include but are not limited to: preference aggregation, welfare criteria, fairness, justice and equity, rights, inequality and poverty measurement, voting and elections, political games, coalition formation, public goods, mechanism design, networks, matching, optimal taxation, cost-benefit analysis, computational social choice, judgement aggregation, market design, behavioral welfare economics, subjective well-being studies and experimental investigations related to social choice and voting. As such, the journal is inter-disciplinary and cuts across the boundaries of economics, political science, philosophy, and mathematics. Articles on choice and order theory that include results that can be applied to the above topics are also included in the journal. While it emphasizes theory, the journal also publishes empirical work in the subject area reflecting cross-fertilizing between theoretical and empirical research. Readers will find original research articles, surveys, and book reviews.Officially cited as: Soc Choice Welf
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