{"title":"侵权赔偿比较说明","authors":"Peter Chau","doi":"10.1111/raju.12415","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"How can tort reparation be justified? Stephen Perry's comparative account relies on two ideas: (1) the loss arising from an injurious event should be distributed between the injurer and the victim rather than be borne by society at large; and (2) the distribution of loss between the injurer and the victim depends on a comparison of their “relative degree of fault.” Many believe that a strength of the comparative account lies in its ability to explain apportionment in contributory negligence cases. I argue, to the contrary, that such cases pose a serious difficulty for the account.","PeriodicalId":45892,"journal":{"name":"Ratio Juris","volume":"12 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6000,"publicationDate":"2024-08-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Comparative Account of Tort Reparation\",\"authors\":\"Peter Chau\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/raju.12415\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"How can tort reparation be justified? Stephen Perry's comparative account relies on two ideas: (1) the loss arising from an injurious event should be distributed between the injurer and the victim rather than be borne by society at large; and (2) the distribution of loss between the injurer and the victim depends on a comparison of their “relative degree of fault.” Many believe that a strength of the comparative account lies in its ability to explain apportionment in contributory negligence cases. I argue, to the contrary, that such cases pose a serious difficulty for the account.\",\"PeriodicalId\":45892,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Ratio Juris\",\"volume\":\"12 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.6000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-08-05\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Ratio Juris\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1111/raju.12415\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"LAW\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Ratio Juris","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1111/raju.12415","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
How can tort reparation be justified? Stephen Perry's comparative account relies on two ideas: (1) the loss arising from an injurious event should be distributed between the injurer and the victim rather than be borne by society at large; and (2) the distribution of loss between the injurer and the victim depends on a comparison of their “relative degree of fault.” Many believe that a strength of the comparative account lies in its ability to explain apportionment in contributory negligence cases. I argue, to the contrary, that such cases pose a serious difficulty for the account.