Use of Nash equilibrium in finding game theoretic robust security bound on quantum bit error rate

Nash equilibrium is employed to find a game theoretic robust security bound on quantum bit error rate (QBER) for DL04 protocol which is a scheme for quantum secure direct communication that has been experimentally realized recently. The receiver, sender and eavesdropper (Eve) are considered to be quantum players (players having the capability to perform quantum operations). Specifically, Eve is considered to have the capability of performing quantum attacks (e.g., Wójcik’s original attack, Wójcik’s symmetrized attack and Pavičić attack) and classical intercept and resend attack. Game theoretic analysis of the security of DL04 protocol in the above scenario is performed by considering several game scenarios. The analysis revealed the absence of a Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium point within these game scenarios. Consequently, mixed strategy Nash equilibrium points are identified and employed to establish both upper and lower bounds for QBER. Further, the vulnerability of the DL04 protocol to Pavičić attack in the message mode is established. In addition, it is observed that the quantum attacks performed by Eve are more powerful than the classical attack, as the QBER value and the probability of detecting Eve’s presence are found to be lower in quantum attacks compared to classical ones.