Yichuan Mo, Hui Huang, Mingjie Li, Ang Li, Yisen Wang
{"title":"TERD:防范扩散模型后门的统一框架","authors":"Yichuan Mo, Hui Huang, Mingjie Li, Ang Li, Yisen Wang","doi":"arxiv-2409.05294","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Diffusion models have achieved notable success in image generation, but they\nremain highly vulnerable to backdoor attacks, which compromise their integrity\nby producing specific undesirable outputs when presented with a pre-defined\ntrigger. In this paper, we investigate how to protect diffusion models from\nthis dangerous threat. Specifically, we propose TERD, a backdoor defense\nframework that builds unified modeling for current attacks, which enables us to\nderive an accessible reversed loss. A trigger reversion strategy is further\nemployed: an initial approximation of the trigger through noise sampled from a\nprior distribution, followed by refinement through differential multi-step\nsamplers. Additionally, with the reversed trigger, we propose backdoor\ndetection from the noise space, introducing the first backdoor input detection\napproach for diffusion models and a novel model detection algorithm that\ncalculates the KL divergence between reversed and benign distributions.\nExtensive evaluations demonstrate that TERD secures a 100% True Positive Rate\n(TPR) and True Negative Rate (TNR) across datasets of varying resolutions. TERD\nalso demonstrates nice adaptability to other Stochastic Differential Equation\n(SDE)-based models. Our code is available at https://github.com/PKU-ML/TERD.","PeriodicalId":501332,"journal":{"name":"arXiv - CS - Cryptography and Security","volume":"76 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"TERD: A Unified Framework for Safeguarding Diffusion Models Against Backdoors\",\"authors\":\"Yichuan Mo, Hui Huang, Mingjie Li, Ang Li, Yisen Wang\",\"doi\":\"arxiv-2409.05294\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Diffusion models have achieved notable success in image generation, but they\\nremain highly vulnerable to backdoor attacks, which compromise their integrity\\nby producing specific undesirable outputs when presented with a pre-defined\\ntrigger. In this paper, we investigate how to protect diffusion models from\\nthis dangerous threat. Specifically, we propose TERD, a backdoor defense\\nframework that builds unified modeling for current attacks, which enables us to\\nderive an accessible reversed loss. A trigger reversion strategy is further\\nemployed: an initial approximation of the trigger through noise sampled from a\\nprior distribution, followed by refinement through differential multi-step\\nsamplers. Additionally, with the reversed trigger, we propose backdoor\\ndetection from the noise space, introducing the first backdoor input detection\\napproach for diffusion models and a novel model detection algorithm that\\ncalculates the KL divergence between reversed and benign distributions.\\nExtensive evaluations demonstrate that TERD secures a 100% True Positive Rate\\n(TPR) and True Negative Rate (TNR) across datasets of varying resolutions. TERD\\nalso demonstrates nice adaptability to other Stochastic Differential Equation\\n(SDE)-based models. Our code is available at https://github.com/PKU-ML/TERD.\",\"PeriodicalId\":501332,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"arXiv - CS - Cryptography and Security\",\"volume\":\"76 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-09-09\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"arXiv - CS - Cryptography and Security\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/arxiv-2409.05294\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"arXiv - CS - Cryptography and Security","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/arxiv-2409.05294","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
TERD: A Unified Framework for Safeguarding Diffusion Models Against Backdoors
Diffusion models have achieved notable success in image generation, but they
remain highly vulnerable to backdoor attacks, which compromise their integrity
by producing specific undesirable outputs when presented with a pre-defined
trigger. In this paper, we investigate how to protect diffusion models from
this dangerous threat. Specifically, we propose TERD, a backdoor defense
framework that builds unified modeling for current attacks, which enables us to
derive an accessible reversed loss. A trigger reversion strategy is further
employed: an initial approximation of the trigger through noise sampled from a
prior distribution, followed by refinement through differential multi-step
samplers. Additionally, with the reversed trigger, we propose backdoor
detection from the noise space, introducing the first backdoor input detection
approach for diffusion models and a novel model detection algorithm that
calculates the KL divergence between reversed and benign distributions.
Extensive evaluations demonstrate that TERD secures a 100% True Positive Rate
(TPR) and True Negative Rate (TNR) across datasets of varying resolutions. TERD
also demonstrates nice adaptability to other Stochastic Differential Equation
(SDE)-based models. Our code is available at https://github.com/PKU-ML/TERD.