惩罚菜单及其威慑效果:探索性分析

IF 1 3区 社会学 Q3 ECONOMICS European Journal of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2024-08-27 DOI:10.1007/s10657-024-09812-0
Gilles Grolleau, Murat C. Mungan, Naoufel Mzoughi
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引用次数: 0

摘要

传统观点认为,允许犯罪者在先前存在的惩罚之外选择其他惩罚并不能增强威慑力,因为犯罪者只需选择成本最低的选项即可。在回顾了威慑研究文献之后,我们认为,惩罚菜单可能会鼓励人们更加关注自己如何理解不法行为,以及如何看待自己行为的道德严重性。我们通过实验测试了人们是否会认为惩罚菜单比同一菜单中的独立制裁更具威慑力。我们的结果表明,这种可能性是存在的,而且人们看法的改变通常会受到他们评估惩罚方案时所采用的心态(如计算心态、道德心态)以及他们对违法行为严重性的印象的影响。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。

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Punishment menus and their deterrent effects: an exploratory analysis

Conventional wisdom suggests that allowing offenders to choose alternative punishments to a previously existing punishment cannot enhance deterrence, because offenders can simply select the least costly option available. After reviewing the deterrence research literature, we argue that punishment menus may encourage individuals to focus more on how they construe the wrongdoing and view the ethical gravity of their actions. We experimentally test whether people may perceive punishment menus as more deterrent than stand-alone sanctions available within the same menu. Our results suggest that this is possible, and that changes in people’s perceptions are often mediated by the mindset (e.g., calculative, ethical) they adopt to evaluate punishment schemes as well as their impressions of the seriousness of the illegal act.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.40
自引率
7.70%
发文量
37
期刊介绍: The European Journal of Law and Economics provides readers with high-quality theoretical and empirical research in which both the legal and economic dimensions merge and combine. The journal welcomes articles that promote a better understanding of legal phenomena, legal decisions made by judges, courts or regulatory agencies, and involving economic tools. Theoretical papers are welcome, provided they have a strong basis in law and economics. We also welcome case studies, as well as empirical analyses – including empirical legal studies – and experimental investigations. The European Journal of Law and Economics does not favor any particular topic, but does have a focus on new and emerging problems. European themes are particularly welcome, because we feel it is important to exploit Europe’s considerable institutional diversity in order to build a more robust body of theory and empirical evidence. However, the purpose of the journal is also to showcase the diversity of law and economics approaches, as supplied by an international mix of authors. Drawing on the support of respected scholars from around the world, who serve as consulting editors and editorial board members, the Editors wish to give contributing authors the opportunity to improve their papers, while also offering them a quick and efficient review process. Officially cited as: Eur J Law Econ
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