信任与委托投资:货币医生实验

IF 5.6 2区 经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE Review of Finance Pub Date : 2024-09-10 DOI:10.1093/rof/rfae031
Maximilian Germann, Lukas Mertes, Martin Weber, Benjamin Loos
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引用次数: 0

摘要

投资者对基金经理的信任度越高,就越有信心承担风险(Gennaioli、Shleifer 和 Vishny,2015 年)。我们在实验室实验中用信任博弈的回报金额来衡量可信度,从而验证了这一理论。如果高成本的货币经理人比低成本的货币经理人更值得信赖,那么与低成本的货币经理人相比,投资者会增加对高成本货币经理人的风险投资份额。投资者对高成本资金管理人承担更多风险的意愿会随着信任度的差异而增加。高达三分之一的可信度差异会转化为风险份额的增加。反之亦然,对于通过更值得信赖的基金经理进行的投资,投资者愿意接受更高的成本。我们的研究结果对其他解释是稳健的,表明风险规避渠道足以影响信任行为。
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Trust and Delegated Investing: A Money Doctors Experiment
The more trust investors place in a money manager, the more confident they are to take risk (Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny 2015). We test this theory in a laboratory experiment using the amount returned from a trust game as measure of trustworthiness. Investors increase the share invested risky with high-cost money managers compared to those with low costs when the highcost money managers are more trustworthy than the low-cost ones. The willingness to take more risk with high-cost money managers is increasing in the difference in trustworthiness. Up to a third of the difference in trustworthiness translates into an increasing risky share. Vice versa, investors are willing to accept higher costs for investments made through more trustworthy money managers. Our findings are robust to alternative explanations, demonstrating that the riskaversion channel can be sufficient for trust to influence behavior.
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来源期刊
Review of Finance
Review of Finance Multiple-
CiteScore
7.80
自引率
2.30%
发文量
67
期刊介绍: The Review of Finance, the official journal of the European Finance Association, aims at a wide circulation and visibility in the finance profession. The journal publishes high-quality papers in all areas of financial economics, both established and newly developing fields: • •Asset pricing •Corporate finance •Banking and market microstructure •Law and finance •Behavioral finance •Experimental finance Review of Finance occasionally publishes special issues on timely topics, including selected papers presented at the meetings of the European Finance Association or at other selected conferences in the field.
期刊最新文献
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