{"title":"退还条款和内幕交易利润","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107242","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Mitigating managerial rent extraction in the form of excess pay and insider trading profits based on financial misreporting is an important governance issue. Clawback provisions allow companies to recover excess pay related to misreported earnings when accounting restatements occur in subsequent periods. We examine whether clawback provisions effectively restrict insider trading profits through improved financial reporting quality. Our finding is that insider trading profits decrease after clawback adoption, and this effect is more prominent when clawback provisions are adopted to improve rather than signal already high levels of financial reporting quality. Moreover, we find that offering managers additional explicit pay to compensate for the increased compensation risk imposed by clawback provisions enhances the effectiveness of these provisions in curbing insider trading profits. Overall, our findings support the efficacy of clawback provisions in mitigating rent extraction through insider trading.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48070,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting and Public Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.3000,"publicationDate":"2024-09-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Clawback provisions and insider trading profits\",\"authors\":\"\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107242\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>Mitigating managerial rent extraction in the form of excess pay and insider trading profits based on financial misreporting is an important governance issue. Clawback provisions allow companies to recover excess pay related to misreported earnings when accounting restatements occur in subsequent periods. We examine whether clawback provisions effectively restrict insider trading profits through improved financial reporting quality. Our finding is that insider trading profits decrease after clawback adoption, and this effect is more prominent when clawback provisions are adopted to improve rather than signal already high levels of financial reporting quality. Moreover, we find that offering managers additional explicit pay to compensate for the increased compensation risk imposed by clawback provisions enhances the effectiveness of these provisions in curbing insider trading profits. Overall, our findings support the efficacy of clawback provisions in mitigating rent extraction through insider trading.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":48070,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Accounting and Public Policy\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":3.3000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-09-17\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Accounting and Public Policy\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"91\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0278425424000656\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"管理学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS, FINANCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Accounting and Public Policy","FirstCategoryId":"91","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0278425424000656","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
Mitigating managerial rent extraction in the form of excess pay and insider trading profits based on financial misreporting is an important governance issue. Clawback provisions allow companies to recover excess pay related to misreported earnings when accounting restatements occur in subsequent periods. We examine whether clawback provisions effectively restrict insider trading profits through improved financial reporting quality. Our finding is that insider trading profits decrease after clawback adoption, and this effect is more prominent when clawback provisions are adopted to improve rather than signal already high levels of financial reporting quality. Moreover, we find that offering managers additional explicit pay to compensate for the increased compensation risk imposed by clawback provisions enhances the effectiveness of these provisions in curbing insider trading profits. Overall, our findings support the efficacy of clawback provisions in mitigating rent extraction through insider trading.
期刊介绍：
The Journal of Accounting and Public Policy publishes research papers focusing on the intersection between accounting and public policy. Preference is given to papers illuminating through theoretical or empirical analysis, the effects of accounting on public policy and vice-versa. Subjects treated in this journal include the interface of accounting with economics, political science, sociology, or law. The Journal includes a section entitled Accounting Letters. This section publishes short research articles that should not exceed approximately 3,000 words. The objective of this section is to facilitate the rapid dissemination of important accounting research. Accordingly, articles submitted to this section will be reviewed within fours weeks of receipt, revisions will be limited to one, and publication will occur within four months of acceptance.
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