虚假标识淘金热:私人执行公共法律的案例研究

Zachary D. Clopton
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引用次数: 0

摘要

联邦法律禁止通过虚假标记专利产品来欺骗公众。一直以来,"虚假标识 "禁令主要通过代表美国的私人诉讼来执行,由原告方和政府分担罚款。当法院的一项判决大幅提高了虚假标识索赔的潜在赔偿额时,律师们立即扑了上去,每周提起的案件数量超过了多年来的最高纪录。事实上,许多以前并不受理专利案件的律师也加入了这一行列。两年内,国会取消了这类虚假标识诉讼,并终止了所有未决案件。本文利用经验数据、律师访谈、立法历史、诉讼文件和新闻来源,讲述了虚假标识诉讼的启示性历史。这段历史表明,由私人当事方为公共利益而提起的私人执法诉讼对市场力量十分敏感。它还表明,即使集中的利益集团鼓励国会减少私人执法,国会也不会像律师协会那样迅速采取行动。这一点很重要,因为一旦国会授权私人执法,该制度的维持就取决于法官和律师对私人执法法规的解释。
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The False Marking Gold Rush: A Case Study of the Private Enforcement of Public Laws
Federal law prohibits deceiving the public by falsely marking an item as patented. The “false marking” prohibition has been enforced primarily by private lawsuits on behalf of the United States, with the party plaintiff and the government splitting the penalty. When a court decision dramatically increased the potential recovery for false marking claims, lawyers pounced immediately, filing more cases per week than had previously been filed in years. Indeed, many lawyers who did not previously work on patent cases joined the fray. Within two years, Congress eliminated this type of false marking suit and terminated all pending cases. Using empirical data, interviews with lawyers, legislative history, litigation documents, and news sources, this article tells the instructive history of false marking litigation. This history shows that the supply of private enforcement—lawsuits by private parties to enforce laws in the public interest—is sensitive to market forces. It also shows that, even when concentrated interests encourage Congress to cut back on private enforcement, Congress does not move as quickly as the bar. This matters because once Congress authorizes private enforcement, the maintenance of that system depends on judges and lawyers interpreting private enforcement statutes.
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