{"title":"差异隐私安全采样协议基准测试","authors":"Yucheng Fu, Tianhao Wang","doi":"arxiv-2409.10667","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Differential privacy (DP) is widely employed to provide privacy protection\nfor individuals by limiting information leakage from the aggregated data. Two\nwell-known models of DP are the central model and the local model. The former\nrequires a trustworthy server for data aggregation, while the latter requires\nindividuals to add noise, significantly decreasing the utility of aggregated\nresults. Recently, many studies have proposed to achieve DP with Secure\nMulti-party Computation (MPC) in distributed settings, namely, the distributed\nmodel, which has utility comparable to central model while, under specific\nsecurity assumptions, preventing parties from obtaining others' information.\nOne challenge of realizing DP in distributed model is efficiently sampling\nnoise with MPC. Although many secure sampling methods have been proposed, they\nhave different security assumptions and isolated theoretical analyses. There is\na lack of experimental evaluations to measure and compare their performances.\nWe fill this gap by benchmarking existing sampling protocols in MPC and\nperforming comprehensive measurements of their efficiency. First, we present a\ntaxonomy of the underlying techniques of these sampling protocols. Second, we\nextend widely used distributed noise generation protocols to be resilient\nagainst Byzantine attackers. Third, we implement discrete sampling protocols\nand align their security settings for a fair comparison. We then conduct an\nextensive evaluation to study their efficiency and utility.","PeriodicalId":501332,"journal":{"name":"arXiv - CS - Cryptography and Security","volume":"47 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-09-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Benchmarking Secure Sampling Protocols for Differential Privacy\",\"authors\":\"Yucheng Fu, Tianhao Wang\",\"doi\":\"arxiv-2409.10667\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Differential privacy (DP) is widely employed to provide privacy protection\\nfor individuals by limiting information leakage from the aggregated data. Two\\nwell-known models of DP are the central model and the local model. The former\\nrequires a trustworthy server for data aggregation, while the latter requires\\nindividuals to add noise, significantly decreasing the utility of aggregated\\nresults. Recently, many studies have proposed to achieve DP with Secure\\nMulti-party Computation (MPC) in distributed settings, namely, the distributed\\nmodel, which has utility comparable to central model while, under specific\\nsecurity assumptions, preventing parties from obtaining others' information.\\nOne challenge of realizing DP in distributed model is efficiently sampling\\nnoise with MPC. Although many secure sampling methods have been proposed, they\\nhave different security assumptions and isolated theoretical analyses. There is\\na lack of experimental evaluations to measure and compare their performances.\\nWe fill this gap by benchmarking existing sampling protocols in MPC and\\nperforming comprehensive measurements of their efficiency. First, we present a\\ntaxonomy of the underlying techniques of these sampling protocols. Second, we\\nextend widely used distributed noise generation protocols to be resilient\\nagainst Byzantine attackers. Third, we implement discrete sampling protocols\\nand align their security settings for a fair comparison. We then conduct an\\nextensive evaluation to study their efficiency and utility.\",\"PeriodicalId\":501332,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"arXiv - CS - Cryptography and Security\",\"volume\":\"47 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-09-16\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"arXiv - CS - Cryptography and Security\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/arxiv-2409.10667\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"arXiv - CS - Cryptography and Security","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/arxiv-2409.10667","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Benchmarking Secure Sampling Protocols for Differential Privacy
Differential privacy (DP) is widely employed to provide privacy protection
for individuals by limiting information leakage from the aggregated data. Two
well-known models of DP are the central model and the local model. The former
requires a trustworthy server for data aggregation, while the latter requires
individuals to add noise, significantly decreasing the utility of aggregated
results. Recently, many studies have proposed to achieve DP with Secure
Multi-party Computation (MPC) in distributed settings, namely, the distributed
model, which has utility comparable to central model while, under specific
security assumptions, preventing parties from obtaining others' information.
One challenge of realizing DP in distributed model is efficiently sampling
noise with MPC. Although many secure sampling methods have been proposed, they
have different security assumptions and isolated theoretical analyses. There is
a lack of experimental evaluations to measure and compare their performances.
We fill this gap by benchmarking existing sampling protocols in MPC and
performing comprehensive measurements of their efficiency. First, we present a
taxonomy of the underlying techniques of these sampling protocols. Second, we
extend widely used distributed noise generation protocols to be resilient
against Byzantine attackers. Third, we implement discrete sampling protocols
and align their security settings for a fair comparison. We then conduct an
extensive evaluation to study their efficiency and utility.