定时自动机的执行时间不透明控制

Étienne André, Marie Duflot, Laetitia Laversa, Engel Lefaucheux
{"title":"定时自动机的执行时间不透明控制","authors":"Étienne André, Marie Duflot, Laetitia Laversa, Engel Lefaucheux","doi":"arxiv-2409.10336","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Timing leaks in timed automata (TA) can occur whenever an attacker is able to\ndeduce a secret by observing some timed behavior. In execution-time opacity,\nthe attacker aims at deducing whether a private location was visited, by\nobserving only the execution time. It can be decided whether a TA is opaque in\nthis setting. In this work, we tackle control, and show that we are able to\ndecide whether a TA can be controlled at runtime to ensure opacity. Our method\nis constructive, in the sense that we can exhibit such a controller. We also\naddress the case when the attacker cannot have an infinite precision in its\nobservations.","PeriodicalId":501332,"journal":{"name":"arXiv - CS - Cryptography and Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-09-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Execution-time opacity control for timed automata\",\"authors\":\"Étienne André, Marie Duflot, Laetitia Laversa, Engel Lefaucheux\",\"doi\":\"arxiv-2409.10336\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Timing leaks in timed automata (TA) can occur whenever an attacker is able to\\ndeduce a secret by observing some timed behavior. In execution-time opacity,\\nthe attacker aims at deducing whether a private location was visited, by\\nobserving only the execution time. It can be decided whether a TA is opaque in\\nthis setting. In this work, we tackle control, and show that we are able to\\ndecide whether a TA can be controlled at runtime to ensure opacity. Our method\\nis constructive, in the sense that we can exhibit such a controller. We also\\naddress the case when the attacker cannot have an infinite precision in its\\nobservations.\",\"PeriodicalId\":501332,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"arXiv - CS - Cryptography and Security\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-09-16\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"arXiv - CS - Cryptography and Security\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/arxiv-2409.10336\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"arXiv - CS - Cryptography and Security","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/arxiv-2409.10336","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

定时自动机(TA)中的定时泄露可能发生在攻击者能够通过观察某些定时行为来推测秘密的时候。在执行时间不透明的情况下,攻击者的目的是通过只观察执行时间来推断某个私人位置是否被访问过。在这种情况下,可以判定 TA 是否不透明。在这项工作中,我们解决了控制问题,并证明我们能够判定 TA 是否能在运行时被控制以确保不透明。我们的方法是建设性的,因为我们可以展示这样一个控制器。我们还解决了攻击者无法无限精确观测的情况。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
Execution-time opacity control for timed automata
Timing leaks in timed automata (TA) can occur whenever an attacker is able to deduce a secret by observing some timed behavior. In execution-time opacity, the attacker aims at deducing whether a private location was visited, by observing only the execution time. It can be decided whether a TA is opaque in this setting. In this work, we tackle control, and show that we are able to decide whether a TA can be controlled at runtime to ensure opacity. Our method is constructive, in the sense that we can exhibit such a controller. We also address the case when the attacker cannot have an infinite precision in its observations.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
期刊最新文献
PAD-FT: A Lightweight Defense for Backdoor Attacks via Data Purification and Fine-Tuning Artemis: Efficient Commit-and-Prove SNARKs for zkML A Survey-Based Quantitative Analysis of Stress Factors and Their Impacts Among Cybersecurity Professionals Log2graphs: An Unsupervised Framework for Log Anomaly Detection with Efficient Feature Extraction Practical Investigation on the Distinguishability of Longa's Atomic Patterns
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1