{"title":"闭环供应链中的决策:政府补贴和风险规避的影响","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.irfa.2024.103566","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Closed-loop supply chains (CLSCs) play a crucial role in promoting sustainable resource management, yet their implementation faces challenges in balancing economic viability with environmental goals. While existing research has explored various aspects of CLSC operations, the interplay between government subsidies and risk-averse behavior of supply chain members remains understudied, particularly in systems involving third-party recyclers. This gap hinders the development of effective policies and management strategies for sustainable CLSCs. Herein, we employ a Stackelberg game-theoretic model to investigate decision-making processes in CLSCs under four distinct subsidy scenarios, incorporating risk aversion through mean-variance utility functions. Our results reveal that subsidy effectiveness significantly depends on remanufacturing costs and risk attitudes of supply chain participants. When remanufacturing costs are high, subsidizing third-party recyclers yields superior environmental and economic outcomes, whereas manufacturer subsidies prove more effective when these costs are low. Moreover, we identify critical thresholds in subsidy levels and risk aversion that alter decision-making patterns. These findings provide a framework for designing targeted subsidy policies and risk management strategies in CLSCs, advancing the field of sustainable supply chain management by offering nuanced insights into the complex dynamics between government interventions, risk preferences, and CLSC performance.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48226,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Financial Analysis","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":7.5000,"publicationDate":"2024-09-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Decision-making in closed-loop supply chains: Effects of government subsidies and risk aversion\",\"authors\":\"\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.irfa.2024.103566\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><div>Closed-loop supply chains (CLSCs) play a crucial role in promoting sustainable resource management, yet their implementation faces challenges in balancing economic viability with environmental goals. While existing research has explored various aspects of CLSC operations, the interplay between government subsidies and risk-averse behavior of supply chain members remains understudied, particularly in systems involving third-party recyclers. This gap hinders the development of effective policies and management strategies for sustainable CLSCs. Herein, we employ a Stackelberg game-theoretic model to investigate decision-making processes in CLSCs under four distinct subsidy scenarios, incorporating risk aversion through mean-variance utility functions. Our results reveal that subsidy effectiveness significantly depends on remanufacturing costs and risk attitudes of supply chain participants. When remanufacturing costs are high, subsidizing third-party recyclers yields superior environmental and economic outcomes, whereas manufacturer subsidies prove more effective when these costs are low. Moreover, we identify critical thresholds in subsidy levels and risk aversion that alter decision-making patterns. These findings provide a framework for designing targeted subsidy policies and risk management strategies in CLSCs, advancing the field of sustainable supply chain management by offering nuanced insights into the complex dynamics between government interventions, risk preferences, and CLSC performance.</div></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":48226,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"International Review of Financial Analysis\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":7.5000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-09-18\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"International Review of Financial Analysis\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1057521924004988\",\"RegionNum\":1,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS, FINANCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"International Review of Financial Analysis","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1057521924004988","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
Decision-making in closed-loop supply chains: Effects of government subsidies and risk aversion
Closed-loop supply chains (CLSCs) play a crucial role in promoting sustainable resource management, yet their implementation faces challenges in balancing economic viability with environmental goals. While existing research has explored various aspects of CLSC operations, the interplay between government subsidies and risk-averse behavior of supply chain members remains understudied, particularly in systems involving third-party recyclers. This gap hinders the development of effective policies and management strategies for sustainable CLSCs. Herein, we employ a Stackelberg game-theoretic model to investigate decision-making processes in CLSCs under four distinct subsidy scenarios, incorporating risk aversion through mean-variance utility functions. Our results reveal that subsidy effectiveness significantly depends on remanufacturing costs and risk attitudes of supply chain participants. When remanufacturing costs are high, subsidizing third-party recyclers yields superior environmental and economic outcomes, whereas manufacturer subsidies prove more effective when these costs are low. Moreover, we identify critical thresholds in subsidy levels and risk aversion that alter decision-making patterns. These findings provide a framework for designing targeted subsidy policies and risk management strategies in CLSCs, advancing the field of sustainable supply chain management by offering nuanced insights into the complex dynamics between government interventions, risk preferences, and CLSC performance.
期刊介绍:
The International Review of Financial Analysis (IRFA) is an impartial refereed journal designed to serve as a platform for high-quality financial research. It welcomes a diverse range of financial research topics and maintains an unbiased selection process. While not limited to U.S.-centric subjects, IRFA, as its title suggests, is open to valuable research contributions from around the world.