上市前股息之谜:对 IPO 定价过低的反应还是 IPO 后的锁定?来自中国的证据

IF 7.5 1区 经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE International Review of Financial Analysis Pub Date : 2024-09-18 DOI:10.1016/j.irfa.2024.103564
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引用次数: 0

摘要

企业在首次公开发行(IPO)前向初始投资者支付现金股利,同时又通过 IPO 募集资金,这仍然是一个谜。利用中国三年首次公开发行前数据的强制披露,我们研究了这一谜题的两种可能解释:对首次公开发行定价过低的战略反应和首次公开发行后的锁定。我们的研究结果表明:(1)当 IPO 公司预期 IPO 定价大幅偏低时,它会在 IPO 前支付更多的现金股利,这表明初始股东认为 IPO 定价大幅偏低低估了公司 IPO 前现金的市场价值。(2)当 IPO 公司在上市前支付更多现金股利时,其初始股东在上市后锁定期满后解禁的股份较少,这表明初始股东通过现金股利获得了 "补偿",以缓解他们对上市后锁定期带来的流动性担忧。这两个结果都支持所提出的解释。其他分析表明,首次公开发行前的高现金分红与固定资产较少、研发投资较少以及首次公开发行后业绩不佳有关。这些结果表明,首次公开发行前的现金股利与股东价值最大化并不一致。总体而言,首次公开募股前的现金股利反映了第二类代理冲突,即初始股东为谋取私利而牺牲未来股东的利益。
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Pre-IPO dividend puzzle: Reaction to IPO underpricing or post-IPO lockup? Evidence from China
It remains a puzzle as to why firms pay cash dividends to initial investors prior to their initial public offerings (IPOs) while at the same time raising capital through the IPOs. Leveraging mandatory disclosure from three years of pre-IPO data in China, we examine two possible explanations for this puzzle: strategic reactions to IPO underpricing and post-IPO lockup. Our findings suggest that (1) when an IPO firm expects a large IPO underpricing, it pays more cash dividends pre-IPO, suggesting that initial shareholders view large IPO underpricing as undervaluing the market value of the firm's cash pre-IPO. (2) When an IPO firm pays more cash dividends pre-IPO, its initial shareholders unload fewer shares post-IPO after lockup expiration, suggesting that the initial shareholders receive “compensation” via cash dividends to ease their liquidity concern from post-IPO lockup. Both results support the proposed explanations. Additional analyses show that high cash dividend payouts pre-IPO are associated with fewer fixed assets, less investment in research and development, and poor performance post-IPO. These results indicate that cash dividends pre-IPO are not consistent with shareholder value maximization. Overall, pre-IPO cash dividends reflect a type II agency conflict in which initial shareholders seek private benefits at the expense of future shareholders.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
10.30
自引率
9.80%
发文量
366
期刊介绍: The International Review of Financial Analysis (IRFA) is an impartial refereed journal designed to serve as a platform for high-quality financial research. It welcomes a diverse range of financial research topics and maintains an unbiased selection process. While not limited to U.S.-centric subjects, IRFA, as its title suggests, is open to valuable research contributions from around the world.
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