{"title":"迭代是直觉的对象吗?","authors":"Bruno Bentzen","doi":"10.1093/philmat/nkae019","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In ‘Intuition, iteration, induction’, Mark van Atten argues that iteration is an object of intuition for Brouwer and explains the intuitive character of the act of iteration drawing from Husserl’s phenomenology. I find the arguments for this reading of Brouwer unconvincing. In this note I set out some issues with his claim that iteration is an object of intuition and his Husserlian explication of iteration. In particular, I argue that van Atten does not accomplish his goals due to tensions with Brouwer’s comments on second-order mathematics and because Husserl does not understand the experience of succession as Brouwer does.","PeriodicalId":49004,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia Mathematica","volume":"38 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8000,"publicationDate":"2024-09-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Is Iteration an Object of Intuition?\",\"authors\":\"Bruno Bentzen\",\"doi\":\"10.1093/philmat/nkae019\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"In ‘Intuition, iteration, induction’, Mark van Atten argues that iteration is an object of intuition for Brouwer and explains the intuitive character of the act of iteration drawing from Husserl’s phenomenology. I find the arguments for this reading of Brouwer unconvincing. In this note I set out some issues with his claim that iteration is an object of intuition and his Husserlian explication of iteration. In particular, I argue that van Atten does not accomplish his goals due to tensions with Brouwer’s comments on second-order mathematics and because Husserl does not understand the experience of succession as Brouwer does.\",\"PeriodicalId\":49004,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Philosophia Mathematica\",\"volume\":\"38 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.8000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-09-26\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Philosophia Mathematica\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"98\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1093/philmat/nkae019\",\"RegionNum\":1,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Philosophia Mathematica","FirstCategoryId":"98","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/philmat/nkae019","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
In ‘Intuition, iteration, induction’, Mark van Atten argues that iteration is an object of intuition for Brouwer and explains the intuitive character of the act of iteration drawing from Husserl’s phenomenology. I find the arguments for this reading of Brouwer unconvincing. In this note I set out some issues with his claim that iteration is an object of intuition and his Husserlian explication of iteration. In particular, I argue that van Atten does not accomplish his goals due to tensions with Brouwer’s comments on second-order mathematics and because Husserl does not understand the experience of succession as Brouwer does.
期刊介绍:
Philosophia Mathematica is the only journal in the world devoted specifically to philosophy of mathematics. The journal publishes peer-reviewed new work in philosophy of mathematics, the application of mathematics, and computing. In addition to main articles, sometimes grouped on a single theme, there are shorter discussion notes, letters, and book reviews. The journal is published online-only, with three issues published per year.